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1 
The Search for Moral Neutrality in Same-Sex Marriage 
Decisions 
 
Adam J. MacLeod* 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
On May 15, 2008, the California Supreme Court in In re Marriage 
Cases
1
 struck down California‘s conjugal marriage and domestic 
partnership statutory scheme. On October 10, 2008 the high court of 
Connecticut struck down that state‘s conjugal marriage and civil union 
scheme.
2
 California and Connecticut thus joined Massachusetts and 
became the second and third states, respectively, to create the institution 
of same-sex marriage and to remove marriage between one man and one 
woman (conjugal marriage) from its privileged place in state law. It is 
instructive to examine a central premise underlying this project to 
redefine ―marriage,‖ namely that the issue can be resolved on morally 
neutral grounds of equality or autonomy. Rejections by high courts in 
Massachusetts, California, and Connecticut of civil unions and domestic 
partnerships, which provide to same-sex couples all or substantially all of 
the rights and responsibilities of marriage, call this premise into question. 
And the search for a morally neutral foundation for same-sex marriage 
has turned out to be much more difficult than many scholars and jurists 
anticipated. 
Indeed, all three state high courts, which have created same-sex 
marriage, have done so by dismissing the states‘ considered conception 
of the meaning and purposes of marriage and by reading into the 
institution their own purposes and fundamental requirements. Despite 
their assertions that they were maintaining neutrality as between 
competing moral conceptions of marriage, all three courts committed 
themselves to morally partisan conceptions of marriage and on those 
foundations held exclusively conjugal marriage unconstitutional. The 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (―SJC‖) declared without 
 
*  Associate Professor, Faulkner University, Jones School of Law. I am indebted to my gifted and 
gracious colleague, Andy Olree, for his insightful criticisms of and comments on an earlier draft. 
Many thanks to the editors of the Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law for their able 
and timely editorial work. All the errors are mine. 
 1. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008). 
 2. Kerrigan v. Comm’r Pub. Health, —A.2d—, 289 Conn. 135 (Conn. 2008). 
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explanation that the essence of marriage is not conjugality but rather 
stable relationships. The California Supreme Court discerned a different 
essence of marriage: individual self-fulfillment. The Connecticut high 
court assumed without explanation that the essence of marriage is the 
individual interest in having a family. On the grounds of their various 
morally partisan conceptions of marriage, all three courts concluded that 
same-sex intimacy is the equivalent of conjugal marriage, an historically 
privileged institution, and is superior in its meaning and purposes to 
other, common relational arrangements, such as friendship, political 
affiliation, polyandry, and polygamy. 
For four years prior to the California Supreme Court‘s decision, the 
Goodridge decision
3
 of the Massachusetts SJC was the only judicial 
rejection in the United States of exclusively conjugal marriage, the union 
of one man and one woman in monogamous commitment. Nearly every 
scholar who has commented on the Goodridge decision has taken as true 
the proposition that the SJC‘s reasoning follows from some morally 
neutral principle, such as equality or tolerance.
4
 However, the 
scholarship has ignored a second marriage decision of the SJC, Opinions 
of the Justices to the Senate,
5
 which the SJC decided only weeks after it 
announced its holding in Goodridge. The legislative civil union proposal 
that the SJC rejected in Opinions of the Justices would have treated 
same-sex couples and conjugal, monogamous couples the same in every 
regard except in terms of moral approbation. 
In Goodridge and Opinions of the Justices, the SJC introduced a new 
conception of marriage as a civil institution constructed around stable, 
intimate relationships. It required the Commonwealth to lend its 
approbation to relationships defined by sexual arrangements other than 
conjugal monogamy. In this sense the SJC‘s same-sex marriage decisions 
are perfectionist: they are legal pronouncements founded upon morally 
partisan presuppositions intended to advance those presuppositions.
6
 
 
 3. Goodridge v. Dep‘t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 4. E.g., Mary L. Bonauto, Goodridge in Context, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2005); 
Lawrence Friedman, The (Relative) Passivity of Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 14 B.U. 
PUB. INT. L.J. 1 (2004); Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. 
REV. 431 (2005). 
 5. Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004). 
 6. This article shall use the terms ―perfectionist,‖ ―perfectionism,‖ and ―non-perfectionist‖ 
in the sense that they are employed in moral and legal philosophy. Joseph Raz‘s definition is 
appropriate: ―‗Perfectionism‘ is merely a term used to indicate that there is no fundamental 
principled inhibition on governments acting for any valid moral reason, though there are many 
strategic inhibitions on doing so in certain classes of cases.‖ Joseph Raz, Facing Up: A Reply, 62 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1153, 1230 (1989). For ―strategic inhibitions on‖ one might substitute, prudential 
considerations against. Raz contrasts perfectionist liberalism with ―liberal doctrines of moral 
neutrality.‖ Joseph Raz, Liberalism, Skepticism, and Democracy, 74 IOWA L. REV. 761, 782 (1989). 
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Contrary to the SJC‘s assertions, the decisions do not follow from neutral 
principles to which the aggregate of reasonable persons, with a plurality 
of moral convictions, can assent.
7
 
California‘s adventure in marriage review has fallen prey to the same 
moral partisanship. Prior to In re Marriage Cases, California had both a 
conjugal marriage statute and a domestic partnership law, which granted 
to same-sex couples substantially all of the rights and obligations 
attendant to marriage, much as the legislative proposal in Massachusetts 
would have done.
8
 The California Supreme Court struck these laws 
down, committing itself to the morally partisan proposition that gender is 
irrelevant to the marriage question.
9
 The court denigrated those ―core 
elements‖ of marriage, which the state had always considered central to 
the meaning and purposes of the institution.
10
 It committed itself to the 
moral claim that marriage is essentially a vehicle for advancing 
individual fulfillment.
11
 In this manner the court injected into marriage 
its own moral conception of which aspects of marriage constitute ―core 
elements‖ and which ones can be disregarded.12 And on the basis of this 
moral conception, the court concluded that conjugal marriage does not 
deserve a place of special approbation in law. 
Most recently, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that permitting 
same-sex couples to participate in civil unions, which are afforded all the 
rights and privileges of marriage, but not permitting them to marry, 
offends the equal protection of the law.
13
 Like the Massachusetts and 
 
  A more particular definition of ―perfectionism‖ is that employed by Robert George. 
―Perfectionism holds that one cannot hope to ascertain what is right (and wrong) for governments to 
do—and thus what rights, as a matter of political morality, human beings have—without considering 
what is for (and against) human well-being (including moral well-being) and fulfillment.‖ ROBERT 
GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC MORALITY 161 (Oxford 1993). 
  I do not use the terms to refer to a mode or modes of constitutional interpretation. Thus, I 
do not intend to enter the debate between Cass Sunstein and his critics over the relative merits of 
―minimalism‖ and ―constitutional perfectionism.‖ 
 7. Though defense of these decisions fails on morally neutral grounds, for the reasons set 
forth below, one can attack (and many have attacked) the decisions on morally neutral grounds. One 
morally neutral argument against the decisions is that they constitute judicial overreach. The 
argument is that the Massachusetts Constitution is simply silent on the question how marriage ought 
to be defined. On this view, even if the SJC‘s moral conception of human personhood and human 
sexuality is correct, the SJC ought not to have incorporated its conception into law by judicial fiat. 
  Another morally neutral argument is that the decisions undercut respect for the rule of 
law. For a version of this argument see William C. Duncan, Goodridge and the Rule of Law Same-
Sex Marriage in Massachusetts: The Meaning and Implications of Goodridge v. Department of 
Public Health, 14 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 42 (2004). 
 8. In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 675, 684–85 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). 
 9. See infra Part IV.C.2. 
 10. See infra Part IV.C.1. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Kerrigan v. Comm’r Pub. Health, —A.2d—, 289 Conn. 135 (Conn. 2008). 
 4 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 23 
California high courts, the Connecticut court reached this conclusion by 
tossing out the purposes for which the State of Connecticut had always 
maintained a special place in its laws for conjugal marriage. It identified 
its own purposes for the institution and then determined that same-sex 
couples are similarly situated to conjugal couples for those purposes.
14
 
Several years before state courts entered the fray, scholars on both 
sides argued that moral neutrality is impossible on the question what 
characteristics define ―civil marriage.‖ Dispute over the predicates of 
marriage—including conjugality (spouses are of opposite sexes), 
monogamy (spouses are two, no more and no less), non-consanguinity 
(spouses are not related to each other), and age—is, according to Robert 
George, who defends conjugal marriage,
15
 and Carlos Ball, who favors 
same-sex marriage,
16
 an inherently moral dispute. Far from disproving 
this claim of George and Ball, state courts have thus far failed to justify 
removal of the conjugality requirement on morally neutral grounds. This 
failure suggests a reason why the debate over the state same-sex 
marriage decisions has stalled. Treating the marriage decisions as 
exercises in moral neutrality renders productive discussion of the merits 
of the decisions impossible for the simple reason that the decisions are 
not, in fact, morally neutral. 
Though judicial decisions creating same-sex marriage have failed to 
produce morally neutral justifications, there exists a morally neutral 
rational basis for leaving conjugal marriage laws in place. Courts remain 
morally neutral when they acknowledge the rationality of legislatures‘ 
distinctions between self-evidently distinct relational arrangements—
conjugal monogamy, polygamy, same-sex intimacy, non-sexual 
friendship—where legislatures have created distinct legal categories for 
various types of relationships. 
Part II of this article contrasts the non-perfectionist rhetoric of the 
SJC‘s Goodridge decision with the SJC‘s perfectionist ambitions, made 
manifest in the subsequent Opinions of the Justices, and explains why the 
two decisions together cannot be understood as morally neutral rulings. 
Part III explains why morally neutral principles of equality and 
autonomy do not support the SJC‘s same-sex marriage decisions. Part IV 
considers the judicial re-definition of marriage in California. It begins 
with the decision of the California Court of Appeal in In re Marriage 
 
 14. Id. at 14–15. 
 15. See Robert P. George, Marriage and the Illusion of Moral Neutrality, in TOWARD THE 
RENEWAL OF CIVILIZATION 114, 124–27 (T. William Boxx & Gary M. Quinlivan eds., Eerdmans 
Pub. Co. 1998). 
 16. See Carlos A. Ball, Moral Foundations for a Discourse on Same-Sex Marriage: Looking 
Beyond Political Liberalism, 15 GEO. L.J. 1871 (1997). 
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Cases and that court‘s attempt to resolve the marriage issue in a morally 
neutral manner. It then considers the perfectionist arguments made by 
same-sex marriage advocates to the California Supreme Court, and 
concludes with an examination of the California Supreme Court‘s moral 
perfectionism. Part V examines the similar perfectionist project that the 
Supreme Court of Connecticut undertook. Part VI examines a 
perfectionist account of same-sex marriage that, while it fails to persuade 
this author, renders the Massachusetts, California, and Connecticut same-
sex marriage decisions comprehensible. Part VII offers both morally 
partisan and morally neutral rational bases for upholding states‘ conjugal 
marriage laws. Part VIII briefly summarizes the findings of this piece. 
 
II.  THE MASSACHUSETTS DECISIONS 
 
Before Goodridge, Massachusetts marriage law required as a 
prerequisite to acquisition of a marriage license that the applicants be 
members of opposite sexes. Furthermore, the law provided that any 
marriage in which one or both partners were incapable of conjugal union 
was voidable.
17
 In these and other ways, Massachusetts law approved of 
committed, conjugal monogamy and distinguished it from other sexual 
relationships. It accorded a special status to, and provided legal and 
structural support for, the two-in-one-flesh communion instantiated in a 
monogamous, opposite-sex marriage. In Goodridge the SJC eradicated 
that special status by a one-vote margin. 
Most commentators have read the Goodridge decision as an 
application of the non-perfectionist principle that moral considerations 
should not resolve the question how ―marriage‖ should be defined.18 The 
SJC itself fostered this impression in Goodridge, taking pains to assert 
that moral considerations and convictions did not resolve the question 
before it. 
Commentators have paid insufficient attention to the holding of the 
SJC‘s Opinions of the Justices,19 which followed the Goodridge decision. 
In that decision, a majority of the SJC rejected a proposal by the 
Massachusetts General Court, the state legislature, to create civil unions 
in response to the concerns the SJC had expressed in Goodridge. 
Although the proposal would have resolved all of the Court‘s express, 
 
 17. Martin v. Otis, 124 N.E. 294, 296 (Mass. 1919); Smith v. Smith, 50 N.E. 933, 935 (Mass. 
1898). Neither the SJC nor the Massachusetts legislature has addressed the effect of Goodridge upon 
this provision. 
 18. See authors cited supra note 4. 
 19. Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 569 (Mass. 2004). 
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ostensibly morally neutral concerns,
20
 it was nevertheless an insufficient 
remedy for the ostensible injustice the Court identified in Goodridge.
21
 
When read together, the majority opinion in Goodridge and the 
subsequent Opinions of the Justices make clear that the SJC‘s marriage 
doctrine is not morally neutral. Indeed, the decisions together are 
unreasonable unless understood as judicial exercises in what some have 
derided in other contexts as legislation of morality. 
 
A.  Non-perfectionist Rhetoric and Perfectionist Principle 
 
In Goodridge, the SJC majority began its analysis by declaiming its 
ostensible moral neutrality. It assured the reader of its mindfulness ―that 
our decision marks a change in the history of our marriage law.‖22 It 
recognized the ―deep-seated religious, moral, and ethical convictions‖ 
that underlie arguments on both sides of the question how ―marriage‖ 
ought to be defined and the question whether homosexual conduct is 
moral or rather unworthy of persons who engage in it.
23
 It nevertheless 
insisted, ―Neither view answers the question before us. . . . ‗Our [sic] 
obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our [sic] own 
moral code.‘‖24 
Though nothing prohibited the SJC from examining in Goodridge 
the moral reasons in favor of conjugal marriage, the majority did not 
consider any. The SJC, employing the rational-basis test, cited the extant 
standard that legislative enactments must ―bear[ ] a real and substantial 
relation to the public health, safety, morals, or some other phase of the 
general welfare.‖25 The absence of moral considerations in favor of 
 
 20. This is not to suggest that had the SJC accepted the General Court‘s civil union proposal, 
its Goodridge decision would be capable of a morally neutral reading, only that the holding of 
Opinions of the Justices precluded any reasonable morally neutral interpretation of Goodridge. 
 21. This lesson has direct application in California because the California ―[l]egislature has 
passed landmark legislation providing substantially all the rights, responsibilities, benefits and 
protections of marriage to same-sex couples who register as domestic partners.‖ In re Marriage 
Cases, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 675, 684–85 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (citing CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 297–299.6 
(West 2004)). Section 297.5(a) of the California Family Code provides: 
 
Registered domestic partners shall have the same rights, protections, and benefits, 
and shall be subject to the same responsibilities, obligations, and duties under law, 
whether they derive from statutes, administrative regulations, court rules, government 
policies, common law, or any other provisions or sources of law, as are granted to and 
imposed upon spouses. 
 
 22. Goodridge v. Dep‘t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 559 (2003)). 
 25. Id. at 960 (quoting Coffee–Rich, Inc. v. Comm‘r Pub. Health, 204 N.E.2d 281, 287 
(Mass. 1965)) (emphasis added). 
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conjugal marriage in the majority‘s reasoning resulted both from the 
Commonwealth‘s advocates failing to bring them up, and from the 
majority‘s natural inclination toward one-column bookkeeping in terms 
of moral considerations.  Notably, the rational bases that the 
Commonwealth proffered in support of conjugal marriage did not 
include any purely moral considerations. Instead, the Commonwealth 
identified three prudential considerations that support the traditional 
definition: ―(1) providing a ‗favorable setting for procreation‘; (2) 
ensuring the optimal setting for child rearing, which the department 
defines as ‗a two-parent family with one parent of each sex‘; and (3) 
preserving scarce State and private financial resources.‖26 The 
Commonwealth made no attempt to tie any of these prudential concerns 
to the moral value of conjugal marriage.
27
 
The majority, in passing, mentioned the arguments of some amici 
curia that conjugal marriage ―reflects community consensus that 
homosexual conduct is immoral.‖28 However, it did not address this 
argument, instead reciting provisions of Massachusetts law that prohibit 
discrimination against homosexuals.
29
 In short, the court did not 
consider, much less respond to, any perfectionist arguments in favor of 
conjugal marriage. 
While the Goodridge majority ignored moral arguments for conjugal 
marriage, it employed moral arguments in favor of same-sex marriage. 
Despite the majority‘s disclaimers, much language in the decision 
conveys the impression that, by striking conjugal marriage, the majority 
understood itself to be engaged upon a project of moral approbation for 
homosexual conduct and identity. The Goodridge majority objected to 
exclusively conjugal marriage as ―an official stamp of approval on the‖ 
view that same-sex relationships ―are not worthy of respect‖ because 
they are ―unstable.‖30 It saw itself as vindicating the ―dignity . . . of all 
individuals.‖31 It saw the decision to marry one‘s choice of a sexual 
 
 26. Id. at 961. 
 27. Apparently, Connecticut‘s advocacy before its high court was even worse. There, the 
state expressly disavowed that regulating or encouraging procreation constituted a rational basis for 
conjugal marriage. Kerrigan v. Comm’r Pub. Health, —A.2d—, 289 Conn. 135, 163 n.19, 254 
(Conn. 2008). The state argued (weakly) that its interest in preserving exclusively conjugal marriage 
was its interest in preserving the traditional definition. Id. at 252. 
 28. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 967. 
 29. Id. If the SJC took the amici to argue that Massachusetts ought to discriminate against 
homosexuals, then perhaps it understood itself to be responding to their moral argument. However, 
the moral arguments of the amici in Goodridge did not entail, much less state expressly, that 
discrimination against homosexuals is just, right, or morally permissible. 
 30. Id. at 962. 
 31. Id. at 948. 
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partner as a decision that shape one‘s identity.32 Each of the plaintiffs in 
Goodridge desired not merely ―to secure the legal protections and 
benefits afforded to married couples and their children,‖ but also ―to 
marry his or her partner in order to affirm publicly their commitment to 
each other.‖33 
This language stands in contrast to the majority‘s insistence that it 
was not choosing sides on the question whether privileging exclusively 
conjugal marriage serves moral ends. The majority here portrayed the 
issue as one of public affirmation of and respect for an individual‘s 
choice to marry a member of the same sex. Insistence upon this state-
mandated affirmation and respect makes sense only if the majority was 
committed to the prior moral claims that marriage is primarily a vehicle 
of affirmation of autonomous choice, no matter what that choice may be, 
and that the conjugality element of marriage is not necessary to advance 
the purposes of the institution. 
It is instructive to note that the seven couples who sued the 
Commonwealth in Goodridge sought approbation not for their friendship 
or love, but more particularly for their sexual intimacy with each other. 
The law and the culture in Massachusetts already affirmed non-sexual, 
same-sex commitments in many other contexts, such as business 
partnerships, fraternity pledges, and heroic acts on behalf of fellow 
soldiers in the field of battle. That affirmation was insufficient for the 
Goodridge plaintiffs. They sought approbation of a different kind. They 
requested that the law of Massachusetts be re-written to express equal 
affirmation of same-sex intimacy and opposite-sex, conjugal monogamy. 
The SJC granted this request a few months after Goodridge in Opinions 
of the Justices to the Senate. 
It is also instructive to note the manner in which the SJC loaded the 
dice, by tossing out the Commonwealth‘s understanding of the meaning 
and purposes of marriage and substituting its own fundamental element 
into the equation. The SJC dismissed, in three short paragraphs, the 
Commonwealth‘s interest in facilitating procreation. This prudential 
consideration could not possibly justify conjugal marriage, the court 
concluded, because some conjugal couples marry without procreating, 
while some procreate through non-coital means.
34
 The majority 
acknowledged that procreation is an ―unbridgeable difference between 
same-sex and opposite-sex couples.‖35 However, the majority apparently 
never considered that the Commonwealth‘s prudential interest in 
 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 949. 
 34. Id. at 961–62. 
 35. Id. at 962. 
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encouraging procreation and child-rearing might reflect a more 
foundational moral interest in encouraging a particular type of 
relationship, one of the benefits of which is the propagation of the human 
race through procreation. The moral claim that conjugal marriage is a 
basic human good, and therefore a rational object of choice with 
significant societal benefits (including procreation),
36
 never appeared in 
the court‘s reasoning, not even long enough to be rejected. 
Instead, the SJC read into the institution of marriage its own moral 
value: stability of relationship.
37
 Marriage, the majority insisted, has as 
its central aim the promotion of ―stable, exclusive relationships.‖38 The 
Commonwealth was wrong, the majority thought, to imply that same-sex 
relationships are ―inherently unstable.‖39 This ―destructive stereotype‖ 
attends the equally impermissible conclusion that same-sex relationships 
are ―inferior‖ to conjugal marriages.40 Why, in the SJC‘s view, are same-
sex couples equally able to satisfy the foundational elements of 
marriage? They are capable of having stable relationships. Of course this 
is true as a factual matter. However, it resolves the question whether 
same-sex marriage is consistent with the meaning and purposes of 
marriage only if that meaning and those purposes boil down exclusively 
to relational stability. The court did not explain why this might be so. 
Thus stability became the sine qua non of marriage in Massachusetts, to 
the exclusion of all other moral considerations, without a hearing on 
other, competing moral claims. 
Furthermore, the SJC‘s concern for relational stability extended only 
to intimate same-sex couples. The court did not explain its prior moral 
judgment that intimate, same-sex relationships are more deserving of the 
Commonwealth‘s protection against stability than polygamous, 
polyandrous, or other intimate groupings. 
 
 
 
 
 36. This claim is examined in Section VII.A, infra. 
 37. The majority invoked relational stability as the central justification and purpose for 
marriage throughout its opinion. It asserted, ―Civil marriage anchors an ordered society by 
encouraging stable relationships over transient ones.‖ Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 954. Civil marriage 
reflected ―the Legislature‘s deep commitment to fostering stable families.‖ Id. at 969. Same-sex 
marriage would ensure a ―stable family structure‖ for children of persons involved in same-sex 
relationships. Id. at 964. Ultimately, the majority insisted that the Commonwealth failed to identify a 
justification for conjugal marriage that was consistent with ―promoting stable families.‖ Id. at 968. 
Indeed, the majority found a way to make every other purpose for marriage subsidiary to relational 
stability. 
 38. Id. at 969. 
 39. Id. at 962. 
 40. Id. 
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B.  A Perfectionist Holding 
 
After the SJC‘s Goodridge decision, the Massachusetts legislature 
proposed creating a civil union institution endowed with all of the rights 
and privileges appurtenant to marriage. This proposal, if adopted, would 
have eradicated the ostensible harm that the SJC identified in Goodridge: 
that the conjugal marriage statute denied same-sex couples ―access to 
civil marriage itself, with its appurtenant social and legal protections, 
benefits, and obligations.‖41 The proposal would have honored ―the 
individual liberty and equality safeguards of the Massachusetts 
Constitution,‖ as the SJC read those safeguards in Goodridge, which 
―protect both ‗freedom from‘ unwarranted government intrusion into 
protected spheres of life and ‗freedom to‘ partake in benefits created by 
the State for the common good.‖42 
In Opinions of the Justices, the SJC rejected the civil union proposal 
by a one-vote margin, explaining that conferring on same-sex couples the 
tangible rights and privileges of marriage was insufficient to satisfy its 
mandate in Goodridge.
43
 Opinions of the Justices belies the SJC‘s 
ostensible concern, expressed in Goodridge, that conjugal marriage 
denies to same-sex couples the ―[t]angible as well as intangible benefits 
[that] flow from marriage.‖44 After the Opinions of the Justices the SJC 
can no longer consistently assert that the hardship that conjugal marriage 
works upon same-sex couples ―for no rational reason‖45 is the ground for 
its creation of same-sex marriage. The proposal of the Massachusetts 
legislature to create civil unions would have eradicated the ―omnipresent 
hardships‖46 by granting to ―spouses in a civil union‖ ―all the benefits, 
protections, rights and responsibilities afforded by the marriage laws.‖47 
Indeed, the legislature‘s proposal would have alleviated each of the 
legally cognizable harms that the Goodridge plaintiffs had allegedly 
suffered as a result of the conjugal marriage statute.
48
 Only the lack of 
affirmation by the Commonwealth would have persisted. The proposal 
would have addressed the shortcomings that the SJC saw in conjugal 
marriage, among them that non-married couples did not face the same 
 
 41. Id. at 950. 
 42. Id. at 959. 
 43. Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 569 (Mass. 2004). 
 44. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 955. 
 45. Id. at 968. 
 46. Opinions of the Justices, 802 N.E.2d at 567. 
 47. Id. at 568 (quoting Senate No. 2175 section 2). 
 48. The harms identified in the complaint included difficulty gaining in-hospital access to a 
child born to one partner and inability to gain coverage under a partner‘s insurance policy. 
Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 950 n.6. 
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restrictions on disposition of assets
49
 and did not enjoy the same property 
rights
50
 as married couples. The SJC noted that same-sex couples could 
not file tax returns jointly, hold property as tenants by the entirety, inherit 
from each other, obtain spousal benefits and coverage by various 
insurance policies, be entitled to bereavement leave, be subject to 
universal divorce rules and obligations, or refrain from testifying against 
each other.
51
 
Notwithstanding that the legislature‘s proposal would have attached 
all of those rights, privileges, and obligations to civil unions, the majority 
in Opinions of the Justices rejected the civil union proposal as 
impermissibly discriminatory and irrational; the proposal failed to 
survive the least rigorous scrutiny, thought the SJC.
52
 The civil union 
proposal could not ―possibly be held rationally to advance‖ any 
legitimate state interests.
53
 Indeed, the majority opinion in the Opinions 
of the Justices stands for the proposition that no civil union statute that 
the Massachusetts legislature might concoct could conceivably be 
supported by a rational basis.
54
 
Thus, interpreting its own Goodridge decision less than three months 
after it handed down Goodridge, the four-justice majority in Opinions of 
the Justices abandoned the posture of moral neutrality it had adopted in 
Goodridge. It turned instead to affirmation of the equal moral worth of 
conjugal and non-conjugal intimate relationships. Despite the veneer of 
morally neutral equality, this is a morally partisan project. It entails 
removal of the conjugality element from marriage, which necessarily 
rests upon a more foundational (morally partisan) rejection of those ends 
that are furthered by the participation of both a man and a woman. 
Without expressly acknowledging what it was doing, the SJC majority 
disregarded what the Commonwealth of Massachusetts had always taken 
as true, namely that the meaning and purposes of marriage (including 
reproduction, tradition, the bringing together of two persons who are 
inherently different) are advanced by insistence upon conjugality, the 
SJC majority substituted its own conception of the meaning and purpose 
of marriage and its own notion of what requirements would best serve 
that meaning and purpose. 
After Opinions of the Justices, intimate same-sex relationships are 
accorded, if the members of the relationship so choose, a designation that 
 
 49. Id. at 955 n.13. 
 50. Id. at 955. 
 51. Id. at 955–57. 
 52. Opinions of the Justices, 802 N.E.2d at 569. 
 53. Id. at 569. 
 54. See id. at 581 (Cordy, J., dissenting). 
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historically has distinguished conjugal monogamy from all other 
relationships, whether same-sex, opposite-sex, or asexual. Intimate same-
sex relationships are thus distinguished both from non-intimate same-sex 
relationships—friendships and business, fraternal, and professional 
relationships between members of the same sex—and from non-intimate 
opposite-sex relationships. Conjugal marriage no longer occupies a 
unique class, but rather shares its place of honor with same-sex intimacy. 
When taken together, the Goodridge decision and the Opinions of the 
Justices can reasonably be read only as a declaration that the law must 
not merely remove all legal impediments from same-sex couples desiring 
to live together as married couples, but must also lend its approbation to 
homosexual intimacy, teaching citizens that homosexual intimacy is a 
reason for action equally as reasonable or worthy as conjugal marital 
union. Grasping the implications of Opinions of the Justices, one scholar 
has construed the right of same-sex couples to marry in Massachusetts 
―not as a right to be free from state interference nor even a right to be 
interfered with by the State, but as a right to receive community 
endorsement.‖55 It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the SJC 
intended as a consequence of its rulings that endorsement in public law 
 
 55. Randy Lee, Finding Marriage Amidst a Sea of Confusion: A Precursor to Considering 
the Public Purposes of Marriage, 43 CATH. LAW. 339, 342 (2004). Lee believes that the 
community‘s endorsement is not forthcoming, however. All the SJC has to offer same-sex couples is 
the words of community approval without the attendant reality that the community of Massachusetts 
citizens actually approves. Id. at 342–43. Lee finds the SJC‘s mandate confusing because it 
constitutes an (in Lee‘s estimation, ultimately unsuccessful) attempt to order ―people in a free-
thinking society . . . that they must think in a certain way.‖ Id. at 342. Lee thinks that the putative 
right to force citizens to accept the view that homosexuality is a morally worthy end is illusory. Id. at 
343. 
  Contrary to Lee‘s supposition, the SJC‘s endorsement of a particular moral position does 
not entail ordering thoughts about morality. This endorsement interferes with freedom of thought no 
more than other endorsements of moral positions contained in the law. Laws prohibiting possession 
of narcotics, for example, do not interfere with the freedom of citizens to think and believe that 
possession and use of recreational drugs are not, in fact, immoral acts or that such acts ought not to 
be criminalized. By the same token, repeal of a criminal prohibition on adultery does not interfere 
with the thoughts and beliefs of those who consider adultery immoral, even those who believe 
adultery ought to be criminalized qua immoral act. 
  However, as Lee seems to discern, the SJC‘s mandate in the Opinions of the Justices is 
not without consequence for public discourse on the question which sexual relationships are, and are 
not, moral. That positive law influences public conceptions of the right and the good is an 
uncontroversial observation. See Francis Cardinal George, Law and Culture in the United States, 48 
AM. J, JURIS. 131, 135 (2003); Francis Cardinal George, Law and Culture, 1 AVE MARIA L. REV. 1 
(2003) [hereinafter Law and Culture]; Adam J. MacLeod, The Law as Bard: Extolling a Culture’s 
Virtues, Exposing Its Vices, and Telling Its Story, 1 J. JURIS. 13 (2008). As Francis George has 
observed, the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) recognized ―that 
law, whether just or unjust, functions as a teacher.‖ Law and Culture, at 6. The law is capable of 
initiating a great cultural change and of reinforcing the status quo. Id. ―The Justices [who decided 
Brown] knew that segregation, as a cultural practice, would not end so long as law testified, and thus 
taught, in season and out, that black and white are unequal.‖ Id. It is no accident that the SJC 
majority invoked Brown in Opinions of the Justices. Opinions of the Justices, 802 N.E.2d at 569 n.3. 
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of homosexual intimacy would lead people to reconsider (and reject) a 
view that the SJC deemed morally incorrect, namely that conjugal 
marital relationships are more worthy reasons for action than non-
conjugal relationships. 
Whether or not the SJC‘s decisions have caused citizens to reject 
special approbation for conjugal marriage, the SJC‘s purpose appears to 
have been, at least in part, to influence moral conceptions of the human 
person and marriage. The SJC majority reached farther than was 
necessary merely to remove social stigma from homosexual intimacy.
56
 
It went beyond de-stigmatization to an affirmative declamation of a 
special moral worth inherent in homosexual intimacy. Indeed, it placed 
homosexual intimacy on equal footing with conjugal monogamy, to 
which the Commonwealth had always accorded special status, apart from 
and superior to the status accorded to friendship, business relationships, 
political associations, polygamous groupings, and other relational 
arrangements. By its ruling in Opinions of the Justices, a majority of the 
SJC held that, like conjugal marriage, same-sex intimacy is deserving of 
a special status, higher honor than that accorded to other intimate 
arrangements (such as polyandry and polygamy), and non-sexual 
arrangements, such as friendships and political parties. 
The majority either promoted same-sex intimacy to a special status 
superior to other, common relational arrangements or demoted marriage 
from its special status in order to bring it down to the level of other 
relationships. Either way, the court made a morally partisan judgment 
about the relative moral worth of same-sex intimacy vis-à-vis conjugal 
marriage, on one hand, and less privileged relationships, on the other. 
This judgment is predicated upon the presupposition that same-sex 
intimacy is more deserving of the special esteem accorded to marriage 
than are other common relational arrangements. This presupposition is 
 
 56. This point did not escape the attention of Justice Sosman, who dissented.  He stated, 
 
Today‘s answer to the Senate also assumes that such ―invidious discrimination‖ 
may be found in the mere name of the proposed licensing scheme. If the name chosen 
were itself insulting or derogatory in some fashion, I would agree, but the term ―civil 
union‖ is a perfectly dignified title for this program-it connotes no disrespect. Rather, 
four Justices today assume that anything other than the precise word ―marriage‖ is 
somehow demeaning. Not only do we have an insistence that the name be identical to the 
name used to describe the legal union of opposite-sex couples, but an apparent insistence 
that the name include the word ―marriage.‖ From the dogmatic tenor of today‘s answer to 
the Senate, it would appear that the court would find constitutional infirmity in legislation 
calling the legal union of same-sex couples by any name other than ―marriage,‖ even if 
that legislation simultaneously provided that the union of opposite-sex couples was to be 
called by the precise same name. 
 
Opinions of the Justices, 802 N.E.2d at 579 n.5. 
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anything but obvious. Why is same-sex intimacy more deserving of the 
appellation ―marriage‖ than friendship, business partnership, polygamy, 
polyandry, and political associations? The court did not address this 
question. 
In the Opinions of the Justices, the majority continued to insist that 
its advice to the General Court was ―not a matter of social policy but of 
constitutional interpretation.‖57 And it declaimed, as it had in Goodridge, 
that Massachusetts may not interfere with deep-seated religious, moral, 
and ethical convictions concerning the definition of ―marriage‖ and the 
morality of homosexual conduct.
58
 However, notably absent from the 
majority‘s opinion in Opinions of the Justices is the disclaimer, so 
prominent in the majority opinion in Goodridge, that moral 
considerations were irrelevant to the question then before it. Instead, the 
majority denigrated the special status of conjugal marriage, which it 
thought a form of ―invidious discrimination‖ ―under the guise of 
protecting ‗traditional‘ values.‖59 In other words, only those moral 
considerations that commend conjugal marriage were inappropriate 
grounds for the SJC‘s decision; moral arguments in favor of same-sex 
marriage were not merely appropriate but dispositive.
60
 
 
 57. Opinions of the Justices, 802 N.E.2d at 569. 
 58. Id. at 570. 
 59. Id. 
 60. One might argue that the SJC was being consistent to non-perfectionist principles 
because it was not requiring the Commonwealth to recognize marriage at all, in the first instance. 
The decision to recognize marriage at all was made by the legislature, the argument goes, and the 
SJC was merely correcting an inequality within this set framework. 
  Though it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the SJC was advancing perfectionist 
goals, for the reasons stated above, the extent of the SJC‘s perfectionist ambition is necessarily a 
matter of speculation. For example, we do not know whether the SJC would accept a proposal by the 
legislature to abolish marriage, civil unions, and all other similar institutions. The answer would 
seem to turn on how far the SJC is willing to go to ensure that respect for same-sex intimacy 
receives the law‘s ―stamp of approval.‖ Goodridge v. Dep‘t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 962 
(Mass. 2003). It is conceivable that the SJC might consider itself constrained by the limits of its 
judicial function from overruling a legislative decision to remove from the law approbation for all 
committed, sexual relationships vis-à-vis non-committed or non-sexual relationships. That constraint 
would operate as a limitation not upon the SJC‘s perfectionist principles but rather upon its power to 
found legislation on those principles. 
  Furthermore, the legislative abolition of marriage-like institutions itself would be a 
perfectionist act. And the SJC might approve such a proposal consistent with its perfectionist 
ambition. Abolition of all marriage-like institutions would, in light of the extensive tradition in civil 
and common law of favoring conjugal marriage constitute a perfectionist coup in favor of non-
conjugal unions. To remove the special approbation accorded to conjugal marriage throughout the 
history of our legal tradition is to make a statement about the value of non-conjugal unions, 
including same-sex unions, as against conjugal marriage. More generally, abolition would serve to 
teach through positive law the partisan assertion that all sexual unions are equally moral. 
  On the other hand, it is equally rational to infer that the SJC would reject this 
hypothetical legislation as inconsistent with its commitment to placing the law‘s stamp of approval 
on same-sex monogamy vis-à-vis non-committed relationships, polygamy, etc. Such a holding 
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III.  MORALLY NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES CANNOT EXPLAIN THE SJC‘s 
DECISIONS 
 
The SJC appears to have predicated its decisions on two ostensibly 
neutral principles: equality and autonomy. However, if these principles 
are to remain morally neutral then neither principle justifies the holding 
in Opinions of the Justices. A neutral conception of equality or autonomy 
does not lead one to conclude that same-sex intimacy should be accorded 
a status superior to other common, relational arrangements, such as 
friendships or polygamous groupings. Only when infused with the prior, 
moral assumption that homosexual intimacy adds something to same-sex 
friendship equal in value to conjugal monogamy, do these principles 
render the SJC‘s decisions comprehensible. 
Equality between homosexuals and heterosexuals does not entail the 
conclusion that the majority reached in the Opinions of the Justices 
because the civil union proposal would not have treated heterosexuals 
and homosexuals differently. Unless the majority employed a 
perfectionist approach to the issue how ―marriage‖ should be defined, its 
reasoning on grounds of equality makes no sense. 
The majority‘s invocation, in both Goodridge and Opinions of the 
Justices, of the Supreme Court‘s Lawrence v. Texas61 decision, and its 
favorable quotation of the mystery-of-life passage from Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey,
62
 might suggest that the SJC impliedly rested its 
perfectionist reasoning on some principle of personal autonomy. 
However, the SJC‘s rejection of the legislature‘s civil union proposal 
renders that reading implausible; the Massachusetts legislature‘s civil 
union proposal would have supplied the autonomy that Lawrence and 
Casey demanded. 
 
 
 
 
 
would be perfectly consistent with Goodridge and Opinions of the Justices. And that holding would 
be manifestly perfectionist. 
  It is clear that the California Supreme Court would not permit the State to abolish civil 
marriage. That court stated that the fundamental, individual right to marry a person of one‘s own 
choice includes a right to get married in the first instance, which the State may not abolish or 
abrogate. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 61–62, 425–26. The right to marry ―cannot properly be 
understood as simply the right to enter into such a relationship if (but only if) the Legislature chooses 
to establish and retain it. Id. at 62 (emphasis original). See also Kerrigan v. Comm’r Pub. Health, —
A.2d—, 289 Conn. 135, 323-24 (Conn. 2008) (Zarella, J. dissenting). 
  Thanks to Andy Olree for calling my attention to this hypothetical. 
 61. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 62. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
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A.  The Court’s Equality Analysis 
 
Dicta in the majority opinion in Opinions of the Justices suggest that 
the majority thought it was applying some principle of equality. That 
homosexuals and heterosexuals ought to be equal before the law is a 
morally neutral proposition, which meets with the agreement of 
advocates on both sides of the ―marriage‖ question. For this reason, the 
SJC‘s attempt in its Goodridge decision to contrast the moral views of 
those who believe ―that homosexual conduct is immoral‖ and those who 
believe ―that homosexual persons should be treated no differently than 
their heterosexual neighbors,‖ 63 not only rested upon a false distinction 
but also constituted unhelpful and unnecessary ad hominem against 
advocates of exclusively conjugal marriage.  Indeed, there is no 
inconsistency in both advocating for exclusively conjugal marriage and 
affirming the equal worth and dignity of homosexual and heterosexual 
persons. Thus, if the holding of Opinions of the Justices follows from 
some principle of equal protection of the law, then the decision might be 
morally neutral in at least one sense. 
The holding does not so follow. Though one may affirm equality 
without engaging in moral partisanship, the SJC majority‘s reasoning 
cannot reasonably be read as application of an equality principle. The 
majority found inequality between the institution of marriage and the 
proposed civil union institution. It then conflated individual 
Massachusetts citizens with the respective institutions in which the 
majority assumed each individual would be most likely to participate. 
Stripped of this conflation, the majority‘s reasoning falls apart. Equal 
protection of heterosexual and homosexual persons does not entail that 
conjugal and non-conjugal relationships must receive equal approbation 
in law. 
 
1.  The majority’s fatal conflation 
 
Though the SJC majority lamented the legislature‘s proposal ―to 
relegate same-sex couples to a different status‖ than that which conjugal 
couples enjoy,
64
 it did not undertake to explain whether it thought the 
proposal subjected homosexuals, considered as individuals, to a different 
status than heterosexuals. Rather, it objected to the dissimilitude between 
the labels for marriage and civil unions.
65
 This dissimilitude, it thought, 
 
 63. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 948. 
 64. Opinions of the Justices, 802 N.E.2d at 569. 
 65. Id. at 570. 
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relegated ―same-sex, largely homosexual, couples to second-class 
status.‖66 
This last statement, which glossed over the real and important 
distinctions between same-sex couples, the institutions of civil unions 
and marriage, and individual homosexuals, is the only indication that the 
majority ever recognized, however briefly, its conflation of the 
institution of civil unions with the persons of individual homosexuals. To 
the extent that the majority intended to rest its reasoning on a principle of 
equality, this conflation is fatal to its reasoning. That civil unions would 
have been distinct from marriages would not have worked invidious 
discrimination, or any type of discrimination, based on sexual 
orientation; the Massachusetts legislature distinguished not between 
persons but between institutions. Under the legislature‘s proposal, a 
heterosexual person could have entered into either a civil union (as the 
majority implicitly acknowledged in Opinions of the Justices) or a 
marriage; a homosexual person could enter into either a marriage with a 
person of the opposite sex (as he or she could before Goodridge) or a 
civil union with a person of the same or opposite sex. 
An analogy here might prove useful. The state does not discriminate 
against non-religious persons (conceding, for the moment, that such a 
creature exists) by recognizing in law a distinction between churches, 
synagogues, and mosques, on the one hand, and Kiwanis and Rotary 
clubs on the other. This is true even though religious institutions have 
historically occupied a position of special honor in American law and 
culture.
67
 For the same reasons, states do not violate a neutral principle of 
equality by distinguishing between conjugal marriage and other 
relational arrangements. 
The SJC majority had expressly acknowledged this distinction 
between individuals and institutions in its Goodridge decision. In 
redefining ―marriage‖ it chose to employ the terms ―same sex‖ and 
―opposite sex,‖ rather than ―homosexual‖ and ―heterosexual,‖ because 
―[n]othing in our marriage law [prior to the Goodridge decision] 
precludes people who identify themselves (or who are identified by 
 
 66. Id. 
 67. An additional analogy may be employed by substituting ―Democrat‖ for ―heterosexual,‖ 
―Republican‖ for ―homosexual,‖ ―non-profit‖ for ―marriage,‖ and ―corporation‖ for ―civil union.‖ It 
is commonly believed that Democrats are more inclined toward non-profit work and Republicans are 
more inclined toward for-profit work. However, by distinguishing between non-profit, eleemosynary 
institutions and for-profit, wealth-creating institutions, states do not discriminate against 
Republicans. This is true even if the state grants special privileges and rights, such as tax 
exemptions, to non-profit institutions. And it is true even though, in many circles, non-profit work is 
considered more virtuous and self-sacrificial and a higher calling than commercial labor. It would 
remain true if the state gave for-profit corporations the same rights and privileges as non-profit 
institutions. 
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others) as gay, lesbian, or bisexual from marrying persons of the opposite 
sex.‖68 For this reason, the question that the SJC answered in Goodridge 
was not, as many have mistakenly supposed, whether homosexuals are 
entitled to marry. As the SJC recognized in Goodridge, marriage was 
available to both heterosexuals and homosexuals on equal terms.
69
 
For these reasons, sexual orientation is simply irrelevant to the 
question whether one satisfies the qualifications for conjugal marriage. 
Of course, special approbation for conjugal marriage will adversely 
affect homosexuals by impeding their preferences; a homosexual who 
chooses to enter into a relationship with a member of the same sex 
cannot in a conjugal marriage state use the word ―spouse‖ to describe his 
or her chosen partner. However, the frustration of certain preferences 
does not amount to a legally cognizable inequality, even where the 
contrasted preferences are equally felt and the frustration of preferences 
is unequally distributed. The disparate impact of conjugal marriage laws 
on homosexuals does not create a classification based on sexual 
orientation because equal protection is implicated only when a state 
―selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part 
‗because of,‘ not merely ‗in spite of,‘ it adverse effects upon an 
identifiable group.‖70 
Like homosexuals, polygamists also would prefer not to be confined 
to a choice between conjugal marriage and not marrying, but the law 
does not discriminate against them by presenting to them only those 
options. In a more trivial case, someone living in Oklahoma might prefer 
not to be confined to a choice on Saturday between watching Oklahoma 
football and Oklahoma State football on television. They might prefer to 
watch Stanford. The frustration of that preference, though it causes a 
disproportionately adverse effect upon the Stanford fan, does not mean 
that the television company is discriminating against that person based 
on where they attended school. 
Once one has identified the conflation in which the SJC indulged, it 
becomes easier to see why the SJC‘s reasoning is morally partisan. One 
can defend conjugal marriage without denying that heterosexuals and 
homosexuals ought to be treated equally before the law.
71
 Thus a neutral 
principle of equality does not entail the SJC‘s holding. Instead, the 
proposition that the SJC is left defending is that there exist no relevant, 
 
 68. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 953 n.11. Later, in Opinions of the Justices the majority 
objected to conjugal marriage‘s ban against same-sex couples, not as pairs of homosexuals but rather 
―as same-sex couples.‖ Opinions of the Justices, 802 N.E.2d at 569. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Personnel Adm‘r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979). 
 71. See infra Part VII for a defense along these lines. 
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moral or prudential distinctions between the sexes. A man ought to 
equally be permitted to marry a woman or a man; a woman should be 
free to marry a man or a woman. In the SJC‘s view, gender does not 
matter. The court has removed from ―marriage‖ an element (conjugality, 
with its attendant uniting and procreative functions) that the 
Commonwealth considered essential to the meaning and purposes of 
marriage. It has substituted its own meaning (self-fulfillment) and 
purposes (state-sanctioned affirmation of the special moral worth of 
homosexual intimacy), and its own conception of how to advance that 
meaning and those purposes. One can reach the conclusion that same-sex 
unions and conjugal marriages ought to be treated identically in positive 
law only if one begins with the presupposition that gender and 
conjugality are irrelevant to the meaning and purposes of marriage.
72
 
In Goodridge, the majority did not address the respective rights of 
individual homosexuals and individual heterosexuals, much less did it 
address the rights of homosexuals qua homosexuals. By the same token, 
the question before the SJC in Opinions of the Justices was not whether 
homosexuals must choose civil unions or no state-sanctioned 
commitment and be excluded from civilly recognized institutions 
altogether. Like the conjugal marriage statute, the legislature‘s civil 
union proposal did not distinguish or discriminate between heterosexuals 
and homosexuals.
73
 For the reasons stated above, the legislature‘s 
proposal accorded to any person, regardless of sexual orientation, equal 
choices with respect to civil, conjugal marriage and civil unions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 72. See George, supra note 15, at 126. 
 73.  Another argument, one that the SJC majority did not employ, would have been that 
exclusively conjugal marriage results in gender discrimination. Justice Greaney, writing in 
concurrence, used a version of this argument. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 971 (Greaney, J., 
concurring). A majority of the California Supreme Court expressly rejected this argument. In re 
Marriage Cases, S147999, slip op. at 85 (Supreme Court of California, George CJ, Kennard, 
Werdegar, Moreno, JJ, May 15, 2008). Because under conjugal marriage laws a man may marry a 
woman but a woman may not do so, the law might be understood to discriminate on the basis of sex.  
  However, this argument fails for two reasons.  First, equal protection forbids only 
discrimination on the basis of a trait that is irrelevant to the purpose of the law. To assume that 
gender is irrelevant to marriage is to assume a controversial, morally partisan position. Thus, even if 
the SJC had found constitutionally infirm discrimination on the basis of sex, rather than 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, its holding and reasoning would have nevertheless 
been morally partisan. 
  Second, conjugal marriage does not discriminate on the basis of gender because the law 
has equal application to both genders. Neither a man nor a woman may marry a member of the same 
sex. The California Court of Appeal made this point in In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 675, 
706 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). 
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2.  The majority’s faulty syllogism 
 
Despite the SJC‘s invocation of Brown v. Board of Education,74 the 
rule and reasoning of Brown was not at all relevant to the issue in 
Opinions of the Justices.
75
 The offensive inequality that Brown 
eradicated resulted from black children having no choice where to attend 
school; blacks were shuttled into separate, and inherently unequal, 
schools because they were black. Similarly, contrary to the SJC‘s 
invocation of it, Loving v. Virginia
76
 is inapplicable to the conjugality 
issue. Loving overruled a regime that prohibited blacks, qua blacks, and 
whites, qua whites, from marrying each other. The law that a white 
woman (for example) could not marry a black man constituted an 
inequality because it discriminated between black and white men on no 
grounds other than their respective races. 
The SJC in Opinions of the Justices confronted an entirely different 
scenario. Under the Massachusetts legislature‘s civil union proposal, a 
person would be assigned to different institutions—civil union or 
conjugal marriage—according to the choice he or she made, not 
according to his or her status as homosexual, heterosexual, bisexual, or 
based upon any other characteristics or predispositions. The mistaken 
assumption that a heterosexual person will always choose conjugal 
marriage and a homosexual person will always choose civil union, upon 
which the SJC‘s equality analysis rests (and which the same SJC 
majority had expressly rejected in Goodridge), disregards the importance 
of individual choice. And the principle of equality does not entail that 
persons who choose union with a member of the same sex must be 
permitted to call that union the same name as that assigned to conjugal, 
monogamous unions. 
The common rejoinder to this distinction between persons and the 
institutions they might choose is that homosexuals prefer union with 
someone of the same sex, and thus are unlikely to choose conjugal 
marriage. On this view, all persons must have available equally 
meaningful choices. The choice of conjugal marriage is not a meaningful 
choice for at least some homosexuals because it is a choice to which they 
are not predisposed. 
This rejoinder suffers from fatal flaws. For one, the meaningfulness 
of the choices available does not necessarily correlate with the sexual 
 
 74. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), cited in Opinions of the Justices, 
802 N.E.2d at 569 n.3. 
 75. For a more complete discussion of this point, see Dwight G. Duncan, How Brown is 
Goodridge? The Appropriation of a Legal Icon, 14 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 27 (2004). 
 76. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
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orientation of the chooser. Heterosexuals might be predisposed to a 
same-sex arrangement. Non-homosexuals might choose civil unions for 
any number of reasons, including a desire to support an ailing relative or 
to benefit from tax breaks. Any discrimination between marriage and 
civil unions will not fall exclusively on homosexuals, or even on 
homosexuals qua homosexuals, but rather on all persons who would, if 
the law allowed, choose to be legally united with a member of the same 
sex. Furthermore, those homosexuals who, for whatever reason, choose 
conjugal marriage would suffer no prejudice at all from any disparity 
between marriage and civil unions. 
Under the Massachusetts legislature‘s civil union proposal, which the 
SJC rejected, homosexuals would have had exactly the same number of 
meaningful choices (as same-sex union advocates conceive of 
meaningfulness) as heterosexuals had. A homosexual and a heterosexual 
would each have available the options to enter into a civil union with one 
member of the same sex or to enter into a civil marriage with one 
member of the opposite sex. That the heterosexual might (but not 
necessarily would) prefer marriage and the homosexual might (but not 
necessarily would) prefer civil union would not be a reason to call the 
choices available to them unequal. 
However, assuming arguendo that the meaningful choices available 
to a homosexual are not equal to those available to a heterosexual, a 
neutral principle of equality does not entail changing this circumstance. 
Any mandate that any particular individual, whether heterosexual, 
homosexual, or asexual, have a meaningful choice does not follow from 
the neutral principle of equality employed in Brown. It might arguably 
follow from some commitment to a particular moral conception. 
However, commitment to morally neutral equality does not entail that all 
persons have available to them all desired options, all meaningful 
options, or even a plurality of options. 
For example, under the Massachusetts legislature‘s civil union 
proposal, neither the heterosexual nor the homosexual would have had 
the option to enter into a civil union or marriage with more than one 
person. The option to receive state-sanction for a plural relationship 
might be preferable to a homosexual or heterosexual who prefers 
polygamy or polyandry, and some morally partisan principle, such as a 
personal autonomy right to plural marriage,
77
 might be invoked in favor 
of legal recognition of polygamy. 
Nevertheless, under current Massachusetts law, both the heterosexual 
and the homosexual are equally unable to choose to enter into a 
 
 77. See infra Part III.B. 
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polygamous institution sanctioned by the law of the Commonwealth. 
That the Commonwealth (thus far) sees no principled reason to make 
available the choice of plural marriage does not violate equal protection. 
Equality of persons before the law does not entail equality of the 
institutions from which those persons may choose. Nor does equality of 
persons require that persons have available to them all desired choices. 
The Stanford fan is not denied equal protection of the law by being 
forced to choose between Oklahoma and Oklahoma State games. The 
would-be polyandrist is not denied equality before the law when she is 
forced to choose between having one husband or no husbands. For the 
same reasons, no morally neutral principle of equality explains the 
majority‘s reasoning in Opinions of the Justices. 
 
B.  The Majority’s Invocation of Lawrence-type Autonomy 
 
Those attempting to demonstrate the moral neutrality of the 
Massachusetts same-sex marriage decisions might argue that the 
decisions are premised upon a morally neutral principle of autonomy. 
The argument might proceed as follows: regardless of whether one views 
homosexual conduct as a good, one can nevertheless endorse the 
proposition that the autonomy to choose homosexual conduct is, itself, a 
desirable end. To prevent persons from choosing homosexual conduct, or 
to stigmatize that choice by failing to approve of it in law, is to disparage 
the autonomous choices of homosexual persons, and thus to infringe 
upon their autonomy. 
The SJC gave a hint of its inclination toward this view by its citation 
of Lawrence v. Texas. In Goodridge, the SJC interpreted Lawrence to 
mean ―that the core concept of human dignity,‖ found in the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause, ―precludes government intrusion 
into . . . one‘s choice of an intimate partner.‖78 Recalling Lawrence, the 
Goodridge majority stated: 
 
Recently, the United States Supreme Court has reaffirmed that the 
Constitution prohibits a State from wielding its formidable power to 
regulate conduct in a manner that demeans basic human dignity, even 
though that statutory discrimination may enjoy broad public support. 
The Court struck down a statute criminalizing sodomy. See Lawrence, 
supra at 2478 (―The liberty protected by the Constitution allows 
homosexual persons the right to make this choice‖).
79
 
 
 78. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 948.  
 79. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 958 n.17. 
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The Goodridge majority did not explain how the anti-sodomy statutes in 
Lawrence ―demean[ed] human dignity.‖80 However, at the least, it saw 
anti-sodomy laws and conjugal marriage laws as two forms of the same, 
impermissible regulation of sexual conduct. 
It seems reasonable to infer that the Goodridge majority thought it 
permissible for the Commonwealth to regulate sexual conduct in the first 
instance. If the autonomy principle forbids all legislative judgments 
concerning intimacy, then there ought to be no distinction between 
marriage and non-marriage. The Court maintained that distinction. So the 
Goodridge majority must have understood the autonomy principle 
articulated in Lawrence to require the State, when regulating sexual 
conduct, to refrain from preferring one type of conduct to another. And 
the SJC‘s interpretation of Lawrence appears in a footnote to the 
majority‘s assertion that historical understandings of ―marriage‖ ―must 
yield to a more fully developed understanding of the invidious[ness]‖ of 
conjugal marriage.
81
 One might reasonably infer that the Goodridge 
majority saw Lawrence as exemplifying that more fully developed 
understanding. 
This conception of autonomy made other appearances in Goodridge. 
The majority chided the dissent for its ―narrow focus‖ on procreation as a 
basis for a fundamental right to marry.
82
 It thought a more expansive, and 
thus appropriate, view of marriage encompassed considerations of 
―personal autonomy‖ in addition to family life and child rearing.83 And it 
ultimately perceived conjugal marriage as ―incompatible with the 
constitutional principle of respect for individual autonomy.‖84 Echoing 
the self-actualization rhetoric of Casey and Lawrence, the Goodridge 
majority opined, ―the decision whether and whom to marry is among 
life‘s momentous acts of self-definition.‖85 
It thus appears that the Goodridge majority thought that the 
autonomy principle at work in Lawrence explained, at least in part, what 
injustice it saw in Massachusetts‘ conjugal marriage statute. An unlawful 
government intrusion into autonomous choice, as the SJC conceived of 
it, includes the failure of state government, where it has recognized 
marriage, to endorse the choice as one‘s marital partner of whomever one 
wants to choose. If the autonomy principle of Lawrence supports this 
 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 958. 
 82. Id. at 962. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 949. 
 85. Id. at 955. 
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conception of constitutional liberty, and if Lawrence is morally neutral, 
then Goodridge might be saved from moral partisanship. 
However, Lawrence fails to salvage the moral neutrality of the 
Massachusetts same-sex marriage decisions. Lawrence is susceptible to 
two interpretations. Perhaps the Lawrence Court meant to assert that 
protection of autonomy requires the State to treat all forms of sexual 
conduct the same. The SJC preferred this interpretation. Viewed this 
way, neither Lawrence nor the autonomy principle employed in 
Lawrence is morally neutral; the Lawrence Court in this view has 
substituted its own conception of the meaning and purposes of marriage 
for those adopted by all of the states. Alternatively, Lawrence might 
stand merely for the proposition that the State may not criminalize 
certain types of sexual conduct. Viewed in this manner, whether it is 
morally neutral or not, Lawrence offers no logical framework for 
understanding or explaining the Massachusetts decisions. 
 
1.  Lawrence as guarantor of the right to choose any type of sexual 
conduct 
 
If, as the SJC seems to suppose, Lawrence stands for the proposition 
that constitutional protection of autonomy requires the State to validate 
all choices with respect to sexual relationships then employment of the 
autonomy principle articulated in Lawrence does not save the 
Massachusetts same-sex marriage decisions from moral partisanship for 
two reasons. First, predicating legal approbation of homosexual conduct 
on a principle of autonomy does not avoid the necessity of demonstrating 
that homosexual conduct is valuable. As Robert George has 
demonstrated, autonomy as an end has no intrinsic value.
86
 Autonomy 
adds no value to a valueless choice because autonomy itself does not 
provide an ultimate reason for action. Rather, the value of an 
autonomous choice lies in the end chosen. 
For example, the autonomous choice to enter into a polygamous 
relationship is not rendered valuable by virtue of its being freely and 
autonomously made. A polygamous group in which all persons 
participate voluntarily, free of coercion, does no violence to personal 
autonomy. However, that fact does not make participation in the 
polygamous arrangement a morally upright and valuable choice. Only if 
polygamy is a morally valuable end for human choice can the 
autonomous choice of polygamy be said to be morally valuable. The 
 
 86. George, supra note 6, at 173–82. 
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value of the choice is determined by the end chosen, not by the fact of it 
being chosen freely. 
Second, Justice Kennedy‘s autonomy argument in Lawrence,87 if 
interpreted the way we are considering it in this section, is itself morally 
partisan. The Lawrence majority, like the Goodridge majority, made 
express assertions of its moral neutrality, insisting that ―[ethical and 
moral] considerations do not answer the question before us . . . .‖88  The 
Lawrence majority decided that the ―majority‖ may not ―use the power 
of the State to enforce . . . on the whole society‖ its view of homosexual 
sodomy as immoral.
89
 However, like the anti-perfectionism of 
Goodridge, the anti-perfectionism of Lawrence ran only in one direction. 
The Court demonstrated no qualms about using its power to enforce 
against the states its moral view that autonomy entails a ―right to demand 
respect‖ for homosexual conduct.90 Thus, the majority disdained 
perfectionism in aid of traditional convictions about sexual conduct but 
embraced moral partisanship in demanding respect in law for 
homosexual conduct. 
Indeed, the autonomy that Lawrence arguably defends and that the 
Massachusetts SJC invoked is inconsistent with moral neutrality. The 
Lawrence majority perceived an ―emerging awareness that liberty gives 
substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their 
private lives in matters pertaining to sex.‖91 The majority thought that 
autonomy to choose homosexual relations follows from the right to 
define one‘s own concept of meaning and the universe, which right, 
according to Casey and Lawrence, the Due Process Clause protects.
92
 
This is, to say the least, a controversial position that depends upon a prior 
commitment to a particular, morally partisan view. 
Assuming, arguendo, the validity of the Lawrence Court‘s premise—
the Due Process Clause protects a right to define the meaning of life—
the conclusion that the choice of homosexual conduct promotes self-
actualization does not follow. Unless one starts with the presupposition 
that homosexual conduct is instrumental to the self-actualization process 
described in Casey, one does not arrive at the Lawrence Court‘s 
conclusion that Casey requires the legalization of homosexual sodomy. 
Thus, even if this were the only conclusion that followed from the 
 
 87. Kennedy, writing for the majority, considered the prospect of declaring anti-sodomy laws 
unconstitutional on grounds of equal protection but declined to do so. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 
558, 574–75 (2003). 
 88. Id. at 571. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 575. 
 91. Id. at 572. 
 92. Id. at 573–74 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851). 
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Lawrence majority‘s autonomy principle, the reasoning would be 
morally partisan. 
But the Lawrence majority actually went further. In the Lawrence 
majority‘s view, the State is not merely forbidden to interfere with the 
autonomous choice of homosexual conduct but must, in addition, remove 
from the law all stigma attending such conduct. The supposed ―right to 
demand respect for [non-conjugal] conduct‖ requires the State to remove 
from its criminal laws all expressions of disapprobation of homosexual 
conduct, even where those expressions take the form of minor 
prohibitions—misdemeanors, infractions—rarely or never enforced.93 
The majority worried that, if the Court tolerated a criminal prohibition of 
non-conjugal conduct, ―its stigma might remain even if it were not 
enforceable . . . .‖ The majority imagined that an unenforced law 
prohibiting non-conjugal conduct ―demeans the lives of homosexual 
persons‖94 and denies to them the respect due to their choices. 
This conception of liberty is controversial. Not only must persons be 
free to act autonomously, but additionally, according to the Lawrence 
majority, they must receive from the State respect for the choices they 
make. It is not enough for the State to remain agnostic concerning the 
morality of particular choices. Rather, the State must demonstrate in its 
laws respect for choices that it hitherto treated as unworthy of respect. 
One problem with this reasoning is that it rests upon the assumption 
that anti-sodomy laws were predicated upon anti-homosexual animus, or 
were directed at or intended to stigmatize homosexual conduct. 
However, as an historical claim, this is simply untrue. As the Lawrence 
majority noted, ―early American sodomy laws were not directed at 
homosexuals as such but instead sought to prohibit nonprocreative sexual 
activity more generally.‖95 Indeed, like conjugal marriage laws, anti-
sodomy laws simply were not about homosexuals. Homosexual ―conduct 
was not thought of as a separate category from like conduct between 
heterosexual persons.‖96 
Despite this history, the Lawrence majority thought the stigma of 
anti-sodomy laws ―not trivial.‖97 Though sodomy was ―a minor offense 
in the Texas legal system,‖ it was nevertheless ―a criminal offense with 
 
 93. Id. at 559, 575. 
 94. Id. at 575. This failure to distinguish between persons and their conduct, like the SJC‘s 
failure to distinguish between persons and the institutions in which they choose to participate, 
renders the Lawrence majority‘s reasoning translucent, at best. 
 95. Id. at 568. 
 96. Id. at 569. 
 97. Id. at 575. 
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all that imports for the dignity of the persons charged.‖98 That persons 
convicted under the Texas statute would be required to register as sex 
offenders in at least four states ―underscores the consequential nature of 
the punishment and the state-sponsored condemnation attendant to the 
criminal prohibition.‖99 
Note what the Lawrence majority did not say. It did not assert that 
registration as a sex offender was a disproportionate expression of 
societal disapprobation for homosexual conduct. Many persons who 
consider homosexual conduct unworthy of persons who engage in it, 
including this author, can readily agree that a State-sanctioned 
association between persons who have engaged in homosexual sodomy 
and (for example) persons who have molested children is an excessive 
expression of disapprobation for homosexual conduct. One might further 
oppose the requirement that persons convicted of homosexual sodomy 
register as sex offenders on the additional, prudential ground that the 
requirement does not serve the purpose of the registry, which is to 
protect the public from sexual predators. For these and other reasons, one 
may (and this author does) agree with the proposition that same-sex 
relationships ought not be stigmatized by criminalizing them and at the 
same time maintain that states act rationally by according special status 
to conjugal marriage. Between affirmatively stigmatizing same-sex 
intimacy through criminal convictions and affirmatively according to 
same-sex relationships the special status of marriage lies a third 
alternative that is perfectly rational. Unless the SJC‘s morally partisan 
interpretation of Lawrence prevails, one might rationally oppose 
criminalization of sodomy on prudential grounds and defend conjugal 
marriage on both moral and prudential grounds. 
But the Lawrence majority argued neither that autonomy requires 
any sort of proportionality between immoral sexual conduct and the 
stigma attached to it nor that the registry requirement and criminal 
statutes were unsound as a prudential matter. Instead, it argued that 
autonomy requires the removal of all stigma from a particular type of 
sexual conduct, namely homosexual sodomy. So, even a state like Texas 
that makes homosexual sodomy a minor offense, or a state like Georgia 
that never enforces its anti-sodomy statute has violated Due Process 
because it has neglected its duty to remove from homosexual conduct all 
societal disapprobation. 
Therefore, states cannot satisfy the mandate of Lawrence by 
removing all legal obstacles that lie between persons (whether 
 
 98. Id. Here again, the Lawrence majority was guilty of indulging a convenient conflation, 
this one between persons and their choices. This conflation is fatal for reasons discussed below. 
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heterosexual or homosexual) and the sexual conduct of their choice: 
homosexual sodomy, polygamy, etc. Instead, Lawrence demands that 
states stop treating certain types of sexual conduct as immoral. And in 
the SJC‘s hands, this prohibition means that states must refrain from 
treating same-sex intimacy as less morally valuable (or even valuable for 
different reasons) than conjugal marriage. To the extent that the 
Lawrence Court intended this conception of autonomy, it adopted a 
position of moral partisanship. 
 
2.  Lawrence as guarantor of freedom from criminal liability 
 
If one can construct a morally neutral interpretation of Lawrence, 
based on freedom from criminal liability, one still cannot thereby render 
the Massachusetts same-sex marriage decisions morally neutral. If 
Lawrence merely means that the State may not, for some morally neutral 
reason, punish persons for engaging in homosexual conduct then the 
reasoning of Lawrence fails to explain the Massachusetts same-sex 
marriage decisions. This failure can be demonstrated with a few 
observations. 
 
a.  Condemning a person’s conduct does not demean the person. 
 
First, that the law disparages a particular choice or course of conduct 
does not mean that the law demeans persons who engage in that conduct. 
Thus, the conflation in which both the Lawrence Court and the 
Goodridge court indulged, between persons and the choices they make, 
is untenable. No one ought to suppose, for example, that conviction for 
theft demeans the dignity of the thief. To the contrary, conviction of a 
crime affirms, among other things, that the criminal conduct giving rise 
to the conviction is unworthy of the person who engaged in it and is 
inconsistent with that person‘s status as a law-abiding member of civil 
society. That proposition rests upon the more foundational premise that 
theft is an immoral act. Only by rejecting the immorality of theft can one 
argue that the thief‘s dignity is demeaned by a conviction. 
By the same token, the criminalization of homosexual sodomy 
demeans homosexual persons only if homosexual sodomy is a good end 
to be chosen. However, that predicate is a controversial, morally-partisan 
proposition. Criminal prohibitions of homosexual acts may be 
undesirable for prudential reasons, that is, as a matter of policy. 
However, they do not disrespect homosexuals and are in that sense not 
unjust unless homosexual acts are morally valuable. Indeed, if 
homosexual conduct is unworthy of persons who engage in it, then the 
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law does homosexuals a disservice by treating that conduct as a reason 
for human choice and action. If, on the other hand, homosexual conduct 
is a rational and good object of human choice, then criminalizing that 
choice impedes the homosexual‘s integral human fulfillment. The 
fundamental, moral question is thus unavoidable. To pretend that the 
courts are not taking a side is simply to ignore the morally partisan 
proposition underlying the SJC‘s autonomy principle. 
 
b.  Conjugal marriage does not stigmatize same-sex couples.  
 
Second, the autonomy principle employed in Lawrence does not 
entail the conclusion that the SJC reached in Opinions of the Justices. 
The Lawrence majority insisted that states eradicate all criminal 
prohibitions of homosexual conduct because it found constitutionally 
impermissible the stigma attendant to status as a criminal.
100
 One simply 
cannot equate the stigma of being a criminal and the stigma, if any, of 
not being married, nor would participation in the civil unions that the 
Massachusetts legislature proposed generate any stigma, much less a 
stigma comparable to that attending criminal conviction. 
By recognizing conjugal marriage, the State does not stigmatize 
couples or other groupings, whether heterosexual or homosexual, same 
sex or opposite sex, who are living in committed, supportive 
arrangements. No one supposes, for example, that recognition of 
conjugal marriage entails any disparagement of an adult daughter living 
with and caring for an elderly mother or father. The statute recognizing 
conjugal marriage does not demean the devoted daughter or deny her any 
amount of respect for the choice she has made. Nor does it express 
disapproval of her decision to care for her parents. 
Of course, enshrinement of conjugal marriage as a legal and civic 
institution does entail the approbation of committed, monogamous, 
conjugal relationships relative to non-committed, non-monogamous, or 
non-conjugal, sexually oriented arrangements. The State sanction of 
marriage necessarily involves the State‘s affirmation that certain traits of 
marriage are more desirable than whatever virtues other arrangements 
might offer. However, no principle of autonomy, whether morally neutral 
or otherwise, forbids such approbation. The State lends legal approbation 
to all sorts of choices without infringing the autonomy of persons who do 
not make the approved choices. Tax deductions for charitable donations, 
for example, do not infringe upon the autonomy of persons who do not 
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give to charity, much less (to paraphrase Lawrence) demean their lives or 
disrespect them. 
Furthermore, the state‘s obligation not to stigmatize certain forms of 
intimacy does not entail affirmative endorsement of those relational 
arrangements. For these reasons, Lawrence‘s prohibition against 
stigmatizing same-sex intimacy does not mandate approval of same-sex 
conduct. 
 
c.  Recognition of conjugal marriage does not limit autonomous 
choice. 
 
Perhaps a defender of Opinions of the Justices might argue, 
extending Lawrence, that whether or not conjugal marriage laws attach 
stigma to homosexual conduct, autonomy requires the state to eradicate 
all legal preferences for conjugal marital conduct. On this view, a 
person‘s choice of homosexual conduct is not entirely free and 
autonomous because that choice involves forgoing the legal benefits of 
marriage. Only by choosing conjugal marriage can a person who 
identifies herself as homosexual enjoy the legal appurtenances of 
marriage. Thus, a decision not to choose conjugal marriage is not truly 
free and voluntary. 
This view of Goodridge as an extension of the Lawrence autonomy 
principle beyond the use the Lawrence Court made of it finds some 
support in Goodridge itself. The Goodridge majority acknowledged that 
the Lawrence Court had not resolved the constitutionality of conjugal 
marriage, an issue that was not before it.
101
 
However, this line of reasoning is not persuasive. That different 
choices have disparate consequences is not a problem for autonomy. It is 
uncontroversial that states may permissibly establish or recognize any 
number of institutions even though, by choosing not to participate in a 
particular state-sanctioned institution, individuals forego any rights or 
benefits appurtenant to participation. 
More to the point, this interpretation of Lawrence fails to account for 
the decision of the majority in Opinions of the Justices. In that decision, 
a majority of the SJC rejected as insufficient the General Court‘s 
proposal to eradicate all legal barriers to actualization of same-sex sexual 
preferences. A system of conjugal marriage and civil unions was unjust, 
in the SJC‘s reasoning, notwithstanding its respect for the autonomy of 
persons to choose to enter into homosexual relationships and in spite of 
the legislature‘s removal of all legal obstacles to same-sex unions. 
 
 101. Goodridge v. Dep‘t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003). 
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IV.  CALIFORNIA‘S TURN WITH THE ISSUE 
 
The lessons learned from Massachusetts‘ experience have direct 
application in California, where that state‘s Supreme Court recently 
considered a challenge to California‘s conjugal marriage laws. Both the 
state legislature and the people of California, acting by popular initiative, 
had in separate enactments endorsed the definition of ―marriage‖ as the 
union of a man and woman. Also, as the Massachusetts legislature 
proposed to do, the California ―Legislature has passed landmark 
legislation providing substantially all the rights, responsibilities, benefits 
and protections of marriage to same-sex couples who register as 
domestic partners.‖102 
In striking down California‘s statutory scheme by a one-vote margin, 
the California high court adopted a perfectionist holding. Its holding is 
perfectionist for many of the same reasons that the SJC‘s decisions in 
Goodridge and Opinions of the Justices were perfectionist. However, its 
perfectionism is much less subtle and can easily be perceived in the 
court‘s determinations that California‘s marriage-domestic partnership 
scheme infringed a fundamental right to marry and denied to 
homosexuals equal protection of the laws. The court reached these 
conclusions after committing itself to the moral claims that procreation 
and gender are irrelevant to the question how ―marriage‖ ought to be 
defined. 
 
A.  California Court of Appeal 
 
After a state trial court concluded that conjugal marriage violates the 
California constitution,
103
 the decision was appealed to the California 
Court of Appeal. Like the SJC, the court of appeal began its analysis by 
declaiming its moral neutrality. The court thought its task was ―not to 
decide who has the most compelling vision of what marriage is, or what 
it should be.‖104 The court recognized that the judicial branch ought not 
 
 102. In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 675, 684–85 (Cal. App. 2006) (citing California 
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pass judgment on the validity of any ―value‖ or prefer one moral 
judgment over another.
105
 
Unlike the SJC, the California Court of Appeal remained true to this 
mandate. The California Court of Appeal avoided the conflation so fatal 
to the ostensible moral neutrality of the Massachusetts SJC by 
maintaining the distinction between individual persons of varying sexual 
orientations and the institutions of marriage and domestic partnership. 
The court expressly declined to refer to conjugal marriage as 
―heterosexual unions,‖ noting that the conjugal marriage laws make no 
reference to sexual orientation.
106
 The court noted that in California, as in 
Massachusetts before Goodridge, homosexual individuals were free to 
participate in conjugal marriages.
107
 
The court acknowledged that California has historically understood 
marriage to consist of the union of one man and one woman and inferred 
that those challenging the conjugal marriage law were asking the court to 
create a new right.
108
 It stated, ―Courts simply do not have the authority 
to create new rights, especially when doing so involves changing the 
definition of so fundamental an institution as marriage.‖109 Moral 
judgments about balance, order, beauty, and goodness, and prudential 
judgments concerning the best social policy are all in the exclusive 
purview of the legislative branch, the court asserted.
110
 The question 
before the court distilled to who gets to define ―marriage‖ in a 
democratic state.
111
 The court stated, ―We believe this power rests in the 
people and their elected representatives, and courts may not appropriate 
to themselves the power to change the definition of such a basic social 
institution.‖112 For these reasons, the court upheld California‘s conjugal 
marriage law.
113
 
The California Court of Appeal found that California‘s conjugal 
marriage law neither deprived individuals of a vested fundamental right 
nor discriminated against a suspect class.
114
 So like the Massachusetts 
SJC before it, the court applied rational basis review.
115
 In its search for a 
rational basis, the court was expressly mindful of California‘s domestic 
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partnership law, which grants to domestic partners, ―substantially ‗the 
same rights, protections and benefits‘ as married spouses, and imposes 
upon them ‗the same responsibilities, obligations and duties under law‘ 
as are imposed on married couples.‖116 The existence of this law 
narrowed the court‘s inquiry to whether there existed a rational basis for 
distinguishing between marriage and domestic partnership. 
The rational basis for conjugal marriage, in the view of the Court of 
Appeal, is the state‘s ―strong interest in promoting marriage.‖117 The 
rational basis for domestic partnerships is the state‘s ―interest in 
supporting stable family relationships.‖118 These interests are related by 
the state‘s singular purpose of ―provid[ing] an institutional basis [to] 
defin[e] the fundamental rights and responsibilities‖ of committed 
couples, whether of the same sex or opposite sexes.
119
 The court 
concluded, ―The state may legitimately support these parallel institutions 
while also acknowledging their differences.‖120 
Thus, the court of appeal steered clear of moral partisanship, leaving 
to the people of California and their elected representatives the task of 
discerning morally significant and morally neutral distinctions between 
different relational arrangements. This article examines some of those 
distinctions in section VI, below. 
 
B.  Perfectionist Arguments to the California Supreme Court 
 
On appeal to the California Supreme Court, the petitioners who 
sought judicial creation of same-sex marriage made expressly 
perfectionist arguments. They did not shy away from moral partisanship, 
instead asserting that ―lesbians and gay men are excluded from marriage 
precisely because this institution is considered so sacred.‖121 As the 
petitioners viewed the matter, California‘s domestic partnership laws 
were insufficient to cure the putative constitutional infirmity inherent in 
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conjugal marriage laws. The law must teach that homosexual intimacy is 
equally as morally valuable as conjugal marriage, and thus of greater (or 
at least different) worth than non-marital relationships, and California‘s 
failure to endorse that moral claim was constitutionally impermissible. In 
the words of the petitioners, the state‘s separate categories for marriage 
and domestic partnerships ―unavoidably and unmistakably teaches‖ a 
moral lesson that the petitioners deemed unconstitutional.
 122
 
The petitioners spoke of a societal ―homage‖ paid to marriage.123 
They asserted that marriage affects both the perception that others have 
of the married person and that person‘s self-image.124 They argued that 
participation in the institution improves psychological well-being.
125
 And 
they revealed the core of their complaint when they asserted that 
conjugal marriage laws send a ―powerful message . . . : the State will 
recognize, but it will not honor,‖ intimate same-sex relationships.126 
The honor that the petitioners sought for same-sex relationships was 
forthcoming only if the California Supreme Court accepted the claim that 
same-sex intimacy and conjugal marriage are morally equivalent. That 
claim is morally partisan in the extreme. Nevertheless, the California 
high court adopted it as its own. 
 
C.  The California Supreme Court’s Decision 
 
The California Supreme Court‘s ruling is predicated upon the 
proposition that gender is irrelevant to the marriage question. A woman 
(for example) can choose to marry either a woman or a man. Either 
choice is equally as morally and socially valuable. Attendant to this 
proposition is the rejection of the State‘s conception of the meaning and 
purposes of marriage. The court tossed out the traditional elements of 
marriage and substituted its own elements in their place. And it 
denigrated the purposes of marriage—such as procreation—as the state 
had identified them. It created a new purpose for marriage: individual 
self-fulfillment. 
These are controversial and morally partisan predicates, and they 
infuse the court‘s additional controversial claims that conjugal marriage 
does not deserve a special place in the law, that same-sex intimacy has 
moral value equal to conjugal monogamy, and that same-sex intimacy is 
of greater worth than non-marital relationships. By committing itself to 
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these principles, the California high court abandoned moral neutrality on 
the marriage question. 
Like the Massachusetts SJC and the California Court of Appeal, a 
majority of the California Supreme Court began its opinion by 
declaiming its ostensible moral neutrality. It declared at the outset that 
 
our task in this proceeding is not to decide whether we believe, as a 
matter of policy, that the officially recognized relationship of a same-
sex couple should be designated a marriage rather than a domestic 
partnership (or some other term), but instead only to determine whether 
the difference in the official names of the relationships violates the 
California Constitution.
127
 
 
The majority asserted its awareness of the ―very strongly held differences 
of opinion . . . on the matter of policy.‖128 And the majority justices 
dismissed as irrelevant their own ―views as individuals with regard to 
this question . . . .‖129 
Yet within several paragraphs, the court committed itself to the 
morally partisan proposition that same-sex intimacy is entitled to the 
same legal approbation accorded to conjugal monogamy. 
 
One of the core elements of the right to establish an officially 
recognized family that is embodied in the California constitutional right 
to marry is a couple‘s right to have their family relationship accorded 
dignity and respect equal to that accorded to other officially recognized 
families, and assigning a different designation for the family 
relationship of same-sex couples while reserving the historic 
designation of ―marriage‖ exclusively for opposite-sex couples poses at 
least a serious risk of denying the family relationship of same-sex 
couples such equal dignity and respect.
130
 
 
The court asserted that California‘s statutory scheme harmed same-sex 
couples and their children ―because denying such couples access to the 
familiar and highly favored designation of marriage is likely to cast 
doubt on whether the official family relationship of same-sex couples 
enjoys dignity equal to that of opposite-sex couples.‖131 The court 
expressed its concern that California‘s conjugal marriage law reflected 
 
 127. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 398–99 (emphasis original). 
 128. Id. at 399. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 400. 
 131. Id. at 401. 
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the ―official view‖ that same-sex relationships ―are of lesser stature than 
the comparable relationships of opposite-sex couples.‖132 
The court asserted that a same-sex couple enjoys a fundamental right 
―in having their family relationship accorded the same respect and 
dignity enjoyed by an opposite-sex couple.‖133 Because the term 
―marriage‖ is ―unreservedly approved and favored by the community,‖ 
the word has ―considerable and undeniable symbolic importance.‖134 The 
court appropriated this approbation, favor, and symbolism for same-sex 
intimacy. It thus promoted same-sex intimacy above non-marital 
relationships, such as friendship and polygamy. And it did so in order to 
advance its own ambitions for marriage, which were unrelated to 
traditional purposes, such as unifying persons who are inherently 
different and facilitating procreation. 
California‘s marriage-domestic partnership scheme never withheld 
respect or dignity from any individual heterosexual or homosexual. The 
scheme did affirm the proposition that conjugal monogamy is 
distinguishable from non-conjugal relationships on relevant, discernable 
grounds. The court thought this distinction impermissible because the 
law did not endorse the morally partisan proposition that same-sex 
intimacy has moral worth equal to conjugal monogamy and thus must be 
accorded dignity and respect. 
After defining the fundamental right implicated, the court went on to 
―conclude that although the provisions of the current domestic 
partnership legislation afford same-sex couples most of the substantive 
elements embodied in the constitutional right to marry,‖ California‘s 
statutory scheme infringed a right enjoyed by intimate male-male 
couples and female-female couples ―to marry under the California 
Constitution.‖135 Curiously, the court made no attempt to explain why, on 
this reasoning, polygamous groupings and non-sexually intimate couples 
are as a matter of principle not also entitled to have their relationships 
called ―marriage.‖ 136 Nor did it explain what is to be done with domestic 
partners who are not involved in intimate same-sex relationships. 
 
 132. Id. at 402. 
 133. Id. at 401; see also id. at 445. 
 134. Id. at 445. 
 135. Id. at 401. 
 136. The court attempted to distinguish polygamous and incestuous relationships on the 
prudential ground that such relationships have a ―potentially detrimental effect on a sound family 
environment.‖ Id. at 434 n.52. Of course, any demonstration that a particular polygamous or 
incestuous relationship (or several of them) constituted a healthy family environment would allay 
this concern of the court. Indeed, the court rejected this very same type of argument in favor of 
conjugal marriage when it disassociated conjugal marriage from procreation on the ground that some 
conjugal couples are infertile or choose not to have children, yet are permitted to marry. Id. at 431–
32. The court tried to have it both ways; either generalized assertions about the social utility of 
 1] THE SEARCH FOR MORAL NEUTRALITY 37 
Like the Massachusetts SJC, the California Supreme Court smuggled 
into its autonomy and equality principles a perfectionist commitment to 
granting the approbation of the law to same-sex intimacy. The court 
asserted that the fundamental right to marry and the equal protection of 
the law both require the State of California to approve of (accord 
―respect‖ to) the choice of some persons to engage in homosexual 
conduct. Respect for same-sex relationships generally, including male-
male friendships or female-female business partnerships, is insufficient. 
Instead, the state must affirm the value of intimate, same-sex conduct. 
 
1.  The court’s perfectionist autonomy analysis 
 
Unlike the Massachusetts SJC, the California Supreme Court front-
loaded its perfectionism. By inserting its moral claims into the definition 
of the fundamental right to marry, the California Supreme Court 
denigrated the traditional association between marriage and procreation, 
and it gave marriage a new purpose, namely advancing individual, 
personal fulfillment. 
The court developed the elements of the fundamental right in several 
stages, expanding its definition of the right by degrees, until at last the 
court discerned in the California Constitution a right to require the state 
to approve of one‘s intimate relationship with a member of the same sex. 
In the first stage, the court began with ―the right of an individual to 
establish a legally recognized family with the person of one‘s choice.‖137 
This definition begs the central question whether marriage is inherently 
conjugal. If, as the people of California supposed, marriage is a one-flesh 
communion of a man and a woman, then the state is free to recognize 
marriage in its traditional sense, while permitting each individual to 
marry a member of the opposite sex of his or her own choosing. So, had 
the court stopped here, it might have upheld the will of the people of 
California. 
However, the court continued to amend the right to marry. In the 
second stage, after examining the ways in which marriage is beneficial to 
individuals and society, the court added to the fundamental right the 
―‗positive‘ right to have the state take at least some affirmative action to 
acknowledge and support the family unit.‖138 Whatever form 
acknowledgement and support take in the court‘s view, the right to marry 
 
relational arrangements are permissible grounds for distinguishing between types relational 
arrangements or they are not. In any event, the court cited no data for its generalized ascription of 
detriment to polygamous arrangements. 
 137. Id. at 423. 
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on this conception encompasses at least some official recognition by the 
state. However, even this formulation does not lead to the court‘s 
holding.
139
 If the court were morally neutral between competing 
conceptions of ―the family unit,‖ the fundamental right would remain a 
right to have state support of marriage as the state of California had 
defined it, namely the union of a man and a woman. 
So, the court took yet another step, altering the shape of the 
fundamental right just one paragraph later. In the third stage, the 
fundamental right appeared as an obligation of the state 
 
to grant official, public recognition to the couple‘s relationship as a 
family as well as to protect the core elements of the family relationship 
from at least some types of improper interference by others . . . [and to 
provide] assurance to each member of the relationship that the 
government will enforce the mutual obligations between the partners 
(and to their children) that are an important aspect of the commitments 
upon which the relationship rests.
140
 
 
This formulation satisfied two predicates necessary to the creation of 
same-sex marriage. First, for the first time, the right to marry includes 
the right to receive from the State approbation for one‘s relationship, but 
only if two people are involved in the relationship and those two people 
are ―commit[ted]‖ to each other. With this language the court 
distinguished two-person relationships from polygamy, polyandry, and 
serial unions, effectively segregating same-sex intimacy from those 
arrangements. However, it did not explain its reasoning for doing so.  
Second, this definition of the right set the stage for the court‘s later 
insertion of a morally partisan commitment to moral equivalence 
between conjugal marriage and same-sex intimacy. By its reference to 
the ―core elements of the family relationship,‖ the court prepared the 
reader for its own declaration of which aspects of intimate relationships 
constitute core elements and which are irrelevant to the right to receive 
approbation from the state. By disposing of old ―core elements‖ and 
adding new ones, the court was able to maintain the shell of marriage 
while inserting its own perfectionist substance into that shell. 
The court first tossed aside the core element of tradition. It ignored 
the value that Anglo-American law has historically discerned in conjugal 
 
 139. Writing in dissent, Justice Baxter made this point, observing that none of the cases cited 
by the majority ―holds, or remotely suggests, that any right to marry recognized by the Constitution 
extends beyond the traditional definition of marriage to include same-sex partnerships.‖ Id. at 462 
(Baxter, J., dissenting). 
 140. Id. at 427 (George, C.J.) (citations omitted). 
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marriage, asserting ―that history alone does not provide a justification for 
interpreting the constitutional right to marry as protecting only one‘s 
ability to enter into an officially recognized family relationship with a 
person of the opposite sex.‖141 Then it dispensed with procreation and 
conjugality as core elements of marriage on the ground that not all 
conjugal couples produce children (though no same-sex couples can 
produce children without the participation of a third person of the 
opposite gender).
142
 
Finally, the court placed within the shell of marriage new core 
elements. ―Marriage,‖ the court assured the reader, is fundamentally a 
relationship resting upon personal affections and advancing individual 
fulfillment.
143
 Marriage promotes individual fulfillment by enriching the 
personal lives of those who enter into it,
144
 providing a venue for 
expressions of emotional support,
145
 and increasing happiness and well-
being.
146
 Now the transformation of the fundamental right to marry was 
complete. Freed of its attachment to tradition, conjugality, and 
procreation, marriage became an institution capable of promoting the 
loftiest end of constitutionally protected autonomy: individual, personal 
fulfillment. 
Thus, loaded with the court‘s polemical moral commitments and 
freed from any association with childbearing and child rearing, the 
fundamental right to marry again mutated. The right to marry in this 
fourth stage ―guarantees same-sex couples the same substantive 
constitutional rights as opposite-sex couples to choose one‘s life partner 
and enter with that person into a committed, officially recognized, and 
protected family relationship that enjoys all of the constitutionally based 
incidents of marriage.‖147 From here it was a short step to ―the right of 
same-sex couples to have their official family relationship accorded the 
same dignity, respect, and stature as that accorded to all other officially 
recognized family relationships.‖148 
Thus, by incremental modulation, the court carefully shifted from a 
morally neutral refrain to one containing an antipathy toward conjugal 
marriage‘s privilege in law. The new definition of ―marriage‖ is 
perfectionist in that it is loaded with and predicated upon the court‘s 
moral conception of which aspects of marriage constitute ―core 
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elements‖ and which ones can be disregarded. That conception values 
affection and individual, personal fulfillment and disassociates 
―marriage‖ from conjugality and procreation. On this basis the court 
drew moral equivalence between conjugal marriage and same-sex 
intimacy. 
 
2.  The court’s perfectionist equality analysis 
 
The perfectionism in the court‘s equality analysis is even less subtle. 
The court conceived an equality so gender-blind that it renders the self-
evident differences between men and women irrelevant to the question of 
how ―marriage‖ ought to be defined. It then used this conception of 
equality to overturn California‘s definition of ―marriage.‖ 
The court agreed with the state attorney general ―that the provisions 
of the Domestic Partner Act afford same-sex couples most of the 
substantive attributes to which they are constitutionally entitled under the 
state constitutional right to marry.‖149 Indeed, the court concluded that 
the only distinction in California between domestic partnerships and 
marriages is the designation, ―marriage.‖150 Nevertheless, according to 
the court the ―historic and highly respected designation of marriage‖ 
must also be made available to same-sex couples so that their relational 
arrangements may receive the moral approbation (―dignity and respect‖) 
of the law.
151
 Otherwise, California law denies to same-sex couples equal 
protection of the laws.
152
 This account of equality makes no sense if it is 
not perfectionist. 
As a threshold matter, the court rejected the argument in defense of 
California‘s laws that same-sex couples and opposite-sex couples are not 
similarly situated, and that equal protection analysis is thus unnecessary. 
The court stated: 
 
 Both groups at issue consist of pairs of individuals who wish to 
enter into a formal, legally binding and officially recognized, long-term 
family relationship that affords the same rights and privileges and 
imposes the same obligations and responsibilities. Under these 
circumstances, there is no question but that these two categories of 
individuals are sufficiently similar to bring into play equal protection 
 
 149. Id. at 435. 
 150. Id. at 398. 
 151. Id. at 434. 
 152. Id. at 445. 
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principles that require a court to determine whether distinctions 
between the two groups justify the unequal treatment.
153
 
 
This definition of the two groups‘ relevant interests is inapposite. If the 
relevant interest in marriage is receipt of equal rights and imposition of 
equal responsibilities, then the statutory scheme that the court struck 
down was sufficient for equal protection purposes. 
Furthermore, this analogy between the two groups is morally 
partisan. The court prejudiced the comparison by emphasizing 
similarities between the two groups that are relevant only if one first 
commits to moral equivalence between conjugal marriage and same-sex 
intimacy (and thus assumes the conclusion to be reached before 
beginning one‘s analysis) and by ignoring relevant differences. The court 
emphasized the putative value of pairing in ―long-term family 
relationships,‖ the obvious common characteristic, and made no mention 
of conjugality or procreation, two obvious points of distinction. Thus, the 
court began with a commitment to a marriage institution divorced from 
conjugality and procreation and founded solely upon the ability to have a 
relationship. 
The court again smuggled its moral commitments into its definition 
of the suspect class. The court determined that ―sexual orientation‖ is a 
suspect class and that California‘s law discriminated on the basis of 
sexual orientation.
154
 The common response to this definition of the class 
(in fact, the ground on which the court of appeal had rejected this 
definition of the class) is that homosexuals, like heterosexuals, were free 
to marry a member of the opposite sex under California‘s statutory 
scheme. The court dismissed this response as ―sophistic . . . because 
making such a choice would require the negation of the person‘s sexual 
orientation.‖155 It posed a hypothetical statute that restricted marriage to 
couples of the same sex and supposed that such a statute would 
discriminate against heterosexuals on the basis of their sexual 
orientation.
156
 
The moral partisanship underlying this argument is the court‘s 
commitment to the presupposition that gender doesn‘t matter. If relevant 
differences between the sexes exist, as California‘s citizens appear to 
believe, then the choice of conjugal marriage by both heterosexuals and 
homosexuals has value. A man (for example) chooses something of 
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value when he chooses to marry a woman, and the substitution of a 
second man for the woman does not reproduce that value. 
Furthermore, the choice of conjugal marriage does not render a 
homosexual‘s personal integrity nugatory, but defeats only the 
homosexual‘s personal preference. One‘s preference for a member of the 
same sex is relevant to the equality analysis of conjugal marriage only if 
it does not matter whether one is joined in marriage to a member of the 
opposite sex. Only by sequestering common sense observations about 
gender from the equality analysis of marriage can one conclude that 
equality entails same-sex marriage. 
Put differently, equal access to conjugal marriage amounts to 
sophistry only if one first adopts the morally partisan and controversial 
claim that men and women are interchangeable in morally valuable, 
intimate relationships. An individual who chooses to marry a member of 
the opposite sex makes a choice that the common law has affirmed 
throughout its history. In order for an individual man (for example) to 
choose to marry a man rather than join with a woman, the state must first 
endorse the proposition that a man can be substituted for a woman 
without affecting the value of the marital union. That proposition, which 
the California Supreme Court endorsed, is (to say the very least) not 
neutral as between competing moral conceptions of the human person 
and human sexuality. Had the court remained neutral on the moral 
question whether the sexes are interchangeable, it would have left 
California‘s marriage regime intact. 
According to a slim majority of the California Supreme Court, it is 
not enough to grant to same-sex couples all of the rights, benefits, and 
obligations of marriage. Instead, the court required the State to extend 
legal approbation to same-sex intimacy. It pre-loaded into its equality 
analyses the moral claims that conjugal marriage is neither unique, nor 
special, and that the sexes are interchangeable. The court assured the 
residents of California that same-sex intimacy is, in fact, meaningful and 
valuable in the same way and to the same degree as conjugal marriage. In 
short, early on in its decision, a majority of the high court of California 
abandoned any pretense of moral neutrality on the marriage question. 
 
V.  CONNECTICUT 
 
The Connecticut Supreme Court, like the high courts of 
Massachusetts and California, considered and rejected by a one-vote 
margin a scheme that provided an institution (civil unions, in this case) in 
which same-sex partners would enjoy and bear all of the rights, 
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privileges, and responsibilities of marriage.
157
 Like the California and 
Massachusetts courts, the Connecticut majority insisted that it was 
maintaining a position of strict moral neutrality.
158
 It acknowledged, 
―same sex marriage is a subject about which persons of good will 
reasonably and sincerely disagree.‖159 Like the California high court, the 
Connecticut court departed from this neutral position early in its 
reasoning. It began its equal protection analysis by tossing out the 
traditional purposes of marriage and substituting its own. It asserted that 
the purposes of marriage are the sharing of a ―committed and loving 
relationship‖ and ―having a family and raising their children.‖160  In this 
way, the majority ―assume[d] that loving commitment between two 
adults is the essence of marriage, even though the essence of marriage is 
the very question at the heart of this case.‖161 
Of course, as the court observed, same-sex couples have the same 
interests in marriage for these purposes. So the court‘s morally-partisan 
definition of the relevant purposes enabled the court to find that 
Connecticut had denied to homosexual persons, as homosexual persons, 
equal protection of the law. The Connecticut equal protection clause 
compares persons who are similarly-situated ―for the purposes of the law 
challenged.‖162 Because same-sex couples have the interest and capacity 
to pursue the court‘s designated purposes for marriage, it did not matter 
that the conduct they sought to engage in—‖marrying someone of the 
same sex—is fundamentally different from‖ the conduct that had always 
constituted the act of marriage.
163
 So the court‘s morally partisan 
conception of marriage was essential to its preliminary finding that the 
marriage statute implicated equal protection in the first instance. 
Unlike the California court, the Connecticut court hid the mechanics 
of its perfectionism. In a crucial footnote it dismissed the notion that 
―same sex and opposite sex couples . . . are not similarly situated because 
the former cannot engage in procreative sexual conduct.‖164 The fact that 
same-sex couples cannot procreate did not, in the court‘s view, resolve 
the question whether homosexuals and heterosexuals are similarly 
situated ―for present purposes,‖ in other words, the purposes of 
 
 157. Kerrigan v. Comm’r Pub. Health, —A.2d—, 289 Conn. 135, 143 (Conn. 2008) (citing 
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 158. The Connecticut majority quoted directly the Massachusetts SJC‘s declamation that 
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marriage.
165
 The real purposes of marriage, the majority insisted, were 
only the homosexual individual‘s ―interest in having a family and the 
same right to do so‖ that heterosexuals enjoy.166 This interest, shared by 
homosexuals and heterosexuals alike, constituted ―the fundamental and 
overriding similarit[y],‖ which rendered irrelevant ―the mere fact‖ that 
same-sex couples cannot procreate without outside assistance.
167
 Here 
the members of the majority expressly resorted to their personal beliefs. 
The majority did not ―believe that [procreation] so defines the institution 
of marriage that the inability to engage in that conduct is determinative‖ 
of the question of similar situation.
168
 
Having determined that same-sex and conjugal couples are similarly 
situated for the purposes of marriage that the court itself concocted, the 
court went on to determine that homosexuals are a quasi-suspect class 
under the Connecticut Constitution.
169
 Having identified a quasi-suspect 
class, the court applied to the marriage-civil union scheme intermediate 
scrutiny, requiring Connecticut to demonstrate that its law was 
substantially related to an important governmental objective.
170
 
Additionally, the court explained (again, in a footnote) that because of 
the quasi-suspect classification, the state was not permitted to invoke all 
relevant governmental interests but rather only those that ―actually 
motivated the legislature‖ to distinguish between conjugal marriage and 
civil unions.
171
 On this basis, the court declined to consider the reasons 
for conjugal marriage articulated by various amici curiae and one of the 
dissenting justices, Justice Zarella. 
Justice Zarella in dissent noted that, far from discriminating against 
homosexuals, the law of conjugal marriage simply takes no notice of 
sexual orientation; Connecticut‘s marriage laws did not classify persons 
on the basis of sexual orientation.
172
 He observed, ―The ancient definition 
of marriage as the union of one man and one woman has its basis in 
biology, not bigotry.‖173 Indeed, the ―long-standing, fundamental 
purpose‖ of conjugal marriage, which the State of Connecticut had 
always recognized (and had been known from ―ancient‖ times), ―is to 
privilege and regulate procreative conduct.‖174 This was clear, Justice 
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Zarella thought, from a review of our nation‘s long legal tradition.175 
Zarella insisted upon judicial neutrality as between the people‘s 
conception of the purpose of marriage the four-justice majority‘s 
conception, and asserted, ―If the state no longer has an interest in the 
regulation of procreation, then that is a decision for the legislature or the 
people of the state and not this court.‖176 
Justice Zarella identified other reasons for conjugal marriage, which 
are subsidiary to and facilitative of the state‘s fundamental interest in 
encouraging and regulating procreation. These include the ―regulation of 
heterosexual behavior,‖ ordering the relationships in which procreation 
takes place, and ensuring ―a stable family structure‖ for children.177 
Zarella explained the relationship among these functions of conjugal 
marriage. 
 
The institution of marriage provides the important legal and normative 
link between heterosexual intercourse and procreation on the one hand 
and family responsibilities on the other. The partners in a marriage are 
expected to engage in exclusive sexual relations, with children the 
probable result and paternity presumed.
178
 
 
And, Zarella noted, Connecticut had long recognized that conjugal 
marriage ―is necessary for the propagation of the species‖ and for the 
―preservation and education‖ of the offspring of conjugal unions.179 
The ―legal and normative [moral] link‖180 that Justice Zarella 
identified between procreation and the state‘s regulation of procreative 
relationships through civil marriage was served by two important 
functions of conjugal marriage. 
 
First, in order to advance society‘s interest in the survival of the human 
race, the institution of marriage honors and privileges the only sexual 
relationship – that between one man and one woman – that can result in 
the birth of a child. Second, in order to protect the offspring of that 
relationship and to ensure that society is not unduly burdened by 
irresponsible procreation, marriage imposes obligations on the couple 
to care for each other and for any resulting children.
181
 
 
 175. Id. at 326–29. This tradition, of course, was only recently interrupted by one-vote 
majority votes of three state high courts, all of which are discussed in this article. 
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For all of these reasons, it was ―obvious‖ that the classification created 
by conjugal marriage was based not on sexual orientation but rather ―on 
a couple‘s ability to engage in sexual conduct of a type that may result in 
the birth of a child.‖182 
By refusing to consider any of these reasons for and purposes of 
conjugal marriage, the Connecticut Supreme Court ensured that its 
decision, and the four-justice majority opinion justifying that decision, 
would be morally partisan. And by its unexplained insistence that the 
only purposes of civil marriage are the individual‘s interest in sharing a 
committed relationship and having a family, the majority became an 
apologist for a controversial and novel, moral conception of marriage, 
which directly contradicted the considered view of the people of 
Connecticut and every other state. As Justice Zarella noted, the majority 
assumed an answer to the very question it purported to answer.
183
 
 
VI.  A PERFECTIONIST CONCEPTION 
 
That the decisions of the Massachusetts, California, and Connecticut 
high courts are illogical if viewed as exercises in moral neutrality does 
not mean that those decisions are incapable of a comprehensible reading. 
Rather, the decisions can be read intelligibly if they contain an 
unexpressed (and likely unexamined), prior commitment to a particular 
moral principle, namely that same-sex intimacy has moral value equal to 
the moral value of monogamous, conjugal intimacy. 
Indeed, the most reasonable reading of the decisions is that 
majorities of the courts assume that homosexual activity is a worthy end 
or good, a moral reason for action. In this view, homosexual conduct 
adds something of value to less-valuable, non-sexual same-sex 
friendships, and thus ought to receive the encouragement and 
approbation of the law. This assumption, if incorporated implicitly in the 
Massachusetts, California, and Connecticut decisions, renders the courts‘ 
autonomy reasoning comprehensible. 
This argument is not new. Carlos Ball, a same-sex marriage advocate 
who understands himself to make a moral argument for same-sex 
marriage, has long predicated his argument on the putative moral value 
of homosexual intimacy. Ball attempts to ground an argument for same-
sex marriage on ―a recognition that same-sex relationships are 
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normatively valuable.‖184 It is insufficient, in Ball‘s view, to premise 
arguments for same-sex marriage upon non-perfectionist liberalism. 
Though Ball finds persuasive the non-perfectionist arguments that 
homosexual-conduct advocates successfully employed against anti-
sodomy laws, the push for legal recognition of same-sex marriage 
―reflects a fundamental change in what many homosexuals are asking of 
society.‖185 Non-perfectionist principles of equality and tolerance are, 
Ball recognizes, ineffectual to bring about same-sex marriage. Political 
liberalism ―must necessarily remain silent‖ on the justness of same-sex 
marriage because legal approbation of homosexual relationships requires 
―endors[ing] a particular conception of the good, and this political 
liberalism cannot do.‖186 
To illustrate the shortcomings of non-perfectionist liberalism, Ball 
states that a ―political liberal, relying on notions of equality, tolerance, 
and privacy, cannot satisfactorily respond to‖ the argument, commonly 
asserted in defense of conjugal marriage, that a society that recognizes 
same-sex marriages must also recognize polygamous marriages.
187
 Ball 
observes that one can differentiate between or equate polygamous 
relationships and homosexual relationships only ―by engaging in 
normative assessments‖ of the respective values of each.188 
Adumbrating the problem that the Massachusetts, California, and 
Connecticut high courts would later face, Ball wrote, ―Gays and lesbians 
are now asking that society fully recognize their relationships. They seek 
not only eligibility for the receipt of the legal and financial benefits 
associated with marriage, but also the normative acceptance of their 
relationships.‖189 Ball supposed that, if homosexual-conduct advocates 
were seeking for same-sex couples the benefits of marriage without the 
label ―marriage‖ (if they sought civil unions or domestic partnerships, for 
example), sentiments of equality might move the majority to accept that 
proposal. But equality in access to benefits is insufficient for same-sex 
couples ―because gays and lesbians currently seek not only equality in 
 
 184. Ball, supra note 16, at 1875. Ball‘s formulation is (no doubt unintentionally) misleading. 
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the tangible benefits associated with marriage, but also full acceptance in 
a normative sense.‖190 
Ball considered and rejected both Rawlsian and Dworkinian, non-
perfectionist liberalism as foundations for an argument of favor of same-
sex marriage.
191
 Both fail to account for the moral content requisite to 
any argument in favor of same-sex marriage. Ball acknowledges that a 
concession that homosexual acts are immoral or debasing would render 
ineffectual the argument that ―society should condone that immorality by 
recognizing gay marriages even if [as Rawls supposes] there is an 
overlapping political consensus that toleration and equality should be 
encouraged and promoted.‖192 The proposition that society has an 
obligation to approve or reward immoral conduct does not follow from 
the premise that a society must tolerate that conduct. 
Similarly, Dworkin‘s prohibition against punishing someone for 
leading the life he wants to lead does not mandate same-sex marriage; 
recognition of conjugal marriage does not involve coercion or deprive 
unmarried persons of their liberty. Ball recognizes the distinction that the 
Massachusetts SJC majority glossed over: ―Society‘s refusal to recognize 
same-sex marriage does not ‗forbid‘ gays and lesbians from leading the 
lives they think are best for them; it instead entails withholding societal 
approval of their relationships.‖193 
For these reasons, Ball concludes, ―If our society is going to 
recognize same-sex marriage, the supporters of such marriages must 
incorporate perfectionist ideals into their arguments—they must be 
prepared to speak not only in terms of individual rights, but also in terms 
of collective goods and the moral value of same-sex relationships.‖194 
The purpose of this article is neither to critique the merits of Ball‘s 
argument nor to comment on its persuasiveness. Rather, it is helpful to 
consider Ball‘s argument in light of the California and Massachusetts 
courts‘ insistence that they were engaged upon a morally neutral project. 
As Ball recognizes, changing the definition of marriage to include same-
sex relationships is an exercise about which non-perfectionist liberalism 
has nothing to say. 
Ball‘s argument provides an account of marriage that, when read into 
the state same-sex marriage decisions, renders them comprehensible. 
That the SJC understood and intended to play the role of moral teacher is 
illustrated by its reasoning, as demonstrated in Part II, above. As 
 
 190. Id. at 1877 (emphasis omitted). 
 191. Id. at 1883–1909. 
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demonstrated in Part III, the decisions make no sense as applications of 
equality or autonomy principles. Similarly, as demonstrated in Part IV 
above, the California court‘s reasoning does not hold together if stripped 
of the court‘s prior antipathy toward a special status for conjugal 
marriage. But when read as implicit endorsements of the proposition that 
homosexual conduct is a worthy reason for action, the same-sex marriage 
decisions make sense. If one begins, as Ball does, with the premise that 
homosexual conduct has affirmative moral value, one can endorse the 
additional proposition that homosexual conduct adds something of value 
to a relationship between two persons of the same sex.
195
 
Once one has accepted this presupposition, one can logically insist 
that the law equally endorse and approve conjugal, monogamous 
relationships and relationships defined by homosexual conduct. 
However, a court that follows this reasoning has abandoned any moral 
neutrality and has engaged in a perfectionist project, injecting into law 
the controversial moral claims that (1) same-sex intimacy has positive 
moral value and (2) conjugal marriage does not deserve the special place 
in the law it once occupied. 
 
VII.  TWO RATIONAL BASES FOR STATES‘ CONJUGAL MARRIAGE LAWS 
 
Two rational bases ground conjugal marriage laws.
196
 Both rational 
basis arguments begin with the observation that different types of 
relational arrangements—same-sex intimacy, non-sexual friendship, 
conjugal monogamy, polygamy—are self-evidently distinguishable in 
relevant ways. As Robert George has observed, ―Unless one embraces a 
strict (and implausible) belief in androgyny, it is clear that [marriage  
 
 195. This author is among those who reject that premise. This is not to say that relationships 
between persons of the same sex, including homosexual persons of the same sex, have no moral 
value. It is only to say that homosexual conduct adds nothing of value to those relationships but 
instead detracts from the integration of persons in a same-sex relationship by instrumentalizing the 
human body. For more on this point, see Robert P. George & Gerard V. Bradley, Marriage and the 
Liberal Imagination, in IN DEFENSE OF NATURAL LAW 139–60 (Robert P. George ed., Oxford Univ. 
Press 1999); Patrick Lee & Robert P. George, What Sex Can Be: Alienation, Illusion, or One-Flesh 
Union, 42 AM. J. JURIS. 135 (1997). 
 196. The California Supreme Court held, contra the Massachusetts SJC and the California 
Court of Appeal, that conjugal marriage statutes discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation, a 
suspect class under the California constitution, and that same-sex couples have a fundamental right 
to receive the law‘s ―respect,‖ and for those reasons applied strict scrutiny review. In re Marriage 
Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 400, 421 (Cal. 2008). As demonstrated in section IV.C.2 above, the premise of 
the court‘s equal protection assertion is wrong. Conjugal marriage laws have exactly the same 
application to homosexuals that they have to heterosexuals, permitting persons of all sexual 
orientations to marry one person of the opposite sex who is not a close relative or a minor and not 
married to a third person. 
  As for the fundamental right, the court gave no reason why this right should be limited to 
same-sex couples, rather than polygamous and other groupings, and none appears in logic, as set 
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between one man and one woman] is scarcely an arbitrarily drawn 
class.‖197 
The class of conjugal marriage is defined by readily discernable 
features that bear rational relationships to both (1) particular moral goods 
and (2) morally neutral societal benefits. For whatever reasons state 
legislatures distinguish between same-sex and opposite-sex unions, the 
capacity to make this distinction in law is itself a rational basis for the 
traditional definition of marriage. 
Justice Martha Sosman, writing in dissent, in Opinions of the 
Justices,
198
 seemed to grasp this point. She chastised the majority for 
requiring the legislature to give the statutory schemes for same-sex and 
opposite-sex relational arrangements the same name ―even if the 
statutory schemes are substantively different and those differences stem 
from good and valid reasons.‖199 The majority of the California Court of 
Appeal, in In re Marriage Cases, made an observation similar to this 
when it reasoned that legislatures act rationally by defining the respective 
rights and obligations appurtenant to different relational arrangements.
200
 
This section of the article attempts to flesh out the differences that 
legislatures rationally recognize between same-sex and conjugal 
relationships. 
 
A.  A Morally Partisan Rational Basis for Conjugal Marriage Laws 
 
A morally partisan rational basis for conjugal marriage begins with 
the claim that conjugal marriage is a self-evidently basic good, joining as 
it does a man and a woman in a one-flesh communion that is an intrinsic 
reason for choice and action. This means that conjugal marriage is good 
in and of itself, regardless of any extrinsic benefits that may or may not 
result from being married. So, whether any particular marriage is useful 
for procreation, support, affection, economy, love, pleasure, or even for 
individual fulfillment (to borrow from the California Supreme Court), 
human persons rationally choose to participate in conjugal marriage 
 
forth in section IV.C above. However, the court extends the right only to same-sex couples. So the 
definition of the right, in addition to being morally partisan, is internally inconsistent. 
  Because the bases for applying strict scrutiny are morally partisan and internally 
inconsistent, this article will review conjugal marriage laws under the more sensible rational basis 
standard. 
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when they choose it for its own sake. Gerard Bradley and Robert George 
have made this defense of conjugal marriage. While morally partisan, in 
the sense that it invokes a particular conception of goods and human 
persons, this argument depends only on principles accessible through the 
exercise of practical reason and is therefore rational. 
Bradley and George argue that marriage, consisting of a two-in-one-
flesh communion actualized by sexual acts of the reproductive type, is a 
basic human good, like life, knowledge, and aesthetic experience.
201
 This 
means that marriage is intrinsically good, in addition to being 
instrumentally expedient.
202
 It is reasonably chosen not merely because it 
enables participants to experience other goods, such as love, affection, 
and child rearing, but also because it is good in and of itself; it is, in 
George‘s words, ―a reason for acting whose intelligibility as a reason 
depends on no ulterior end.‖203 
The basic good of marriage is, according to Bradley and George, 
actualized through conjugal sex acts of the reproductive type. Though 
not all conjugal marital sex acts are reproductive in fact, because the 
non-behavioral conditions of reproduction do not always pertain (as 
where one or both of the spouses is infertile), the behavioral conditions 
of reproduction, the bodily union of one man and one woman, are self-
evidently part of marital union.
204
 For this reason, spouses have a basic 
reason to perform conjugal acts. 
By contrast, when people engage in sexual acts that do not actualize 
the self-evident, basic good of marriage they treat the body as a mere 
instrument for the pursuit of pleasure, affection, or some other end, and 
thus damage personal integrity.
205
 Sex acts that are not reproductive in 
type or do not take place within marriage are thus inconsistent with the 
basic human good of integrity, regardless of the sexes or sexual 
orientations of the persons participating in them.
206
 
In other words, conjugal marital sex acts have special value and 
meaning, which non-marital sex acts do not share. Note that the force of 
this argument does not depend upon commitment to any particular 
religious dogma. Rather, the argument follows from the self-evident 
principle that conjugal marriage is a basic human good. This principle is 
 
 201. Robert P. George & Gerard V. Bradley, Marriage and the Liberal Imagination, 84 GEO. 
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 202. Id. at 302. 
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 204. Id. at 157–65, 168. 
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grasped through non-inferential acts of understanding and may be tested 
through dialectical argument.
207
 
Because this defense of marriage begins with an invocation of self-
evidence, it has met the criticism that it is circular and conclusory, and 
thus irrational. For example, Dale Carpenter, a critic of conjugal 
marriage, asserts that Bradley‘s and George‘s defense of conjugal 
marriage ―suffers a fatal circularity.‖208 He faults them for their candid 
reliance upon a self-evident principle, which must be grasped, if at all, in 
non-inferential acts of reasoning. He concludes that Bradley and George 
are guilty of ―because-I-say-so reasoning,‖ which constitutes a ―bad 
argument.‖209 
If Bradley and George offered only their own ipse dixit, as Carpenter 
supposes, then their argument would indeed be bad. However, Carpenter 
pummels a straw man. That Bradley and George make a self-evident 
observation neither defeats the rationality of their argument nor renders it 
circular. Reliance upon self-evident principles is neither new nor 
irrational. The law depends upon numerous self-evident premises 
without thereby defeating its logic; every argument has to start 
somewhere. By starting with a principle grasped through non-inferential 
acts of reasoning, Bradley and George offer a clear starting point, from 
which a straight line departs. 
Proponents of same-sex marriage may disagree with the claim that 
the intrinsic value of conjugal marriage is self-evident. Indeed, many of 
them seem to assume that marital sex is self-evidently not unique.
210
 
Carpenter himself takes as an unexamined first principle that conjugal 
acts are not morally significant. Carpenter‘s conclusion requires 
commitment either to the presupposition that consensual sex is morally 
indistinguishable from consensual arm wrestling or to the presupposition 
that same-sex intimacy is equally as morally valuable as conjugal 
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monogamy. Carpenter does not provide an account of his reasoning on 
this point. 
Regardless, this disagreement on first principles does not defeat the 
moral rational basis for conjugal marriage. As the California Court of 
Appeal recognized, it is not up to courts to choose between competing 
conceptions of human goods where the people have done so either 
through their elected representatives or through direct lawmaking. 
Carpenter also characterizes Bradley‘s and George‘s argument as 
irrational on the much-abused ground that sterile and elderly couples are 
allowed to marry, and homosexual couples are indistinguishable from 
these couples in terms of their ability to procreate.
211
 However, the 
argument for conjugal marriage is predicated neither upon a requirement 
that all marriages produce children nor upon an assumption that all 
marriages will do so. 
In Bradley‘s and George‘s view, marital sex is not an instrumental 
good but rather a constituent aspect of the basic good of marriage. 
Marital sex has special value, irrespective of the fertility of the married 
persons. Indeed, Bradley and George expressly reject the view that sex 
can properly be considered a mere means to any extrinsic end, whether 
that end is procreation, pleasure, or friendship.
212
 So, this argument for 
conjugal marriage runs in the opposite direction of Carpenter‘s 
characterization of it.
213
 
As Bradley and George demonstrate, one can grasp through the 
exercise of reason the unique moral value of conjugal monogamy. If a 
state legislature accepts the claim that conjugal marriage is a basic good, 
then that legislature may rationally lend to conjugal marriage special 
approbation in law, granting to conjugal marriage its own unique civil 
institution. The legal recognition of that institution might encourage and 
incentivize participation in it. Legislatures thus act rationally by lending 
the approbation of law to conjugal marriage on the ground that conjugal 
marriage is a morally valuable relational arrangement, which promotes 
human flourishing. Whether or not courts agree with this moral 
argument, it is rational and thus sufficient to support the defense of 
conjugal marriage from equal protection and due process challenges. 
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B.  A Morally Neutral Rational Basis for Conjugal Marriage Laws 
 
A morally neutral rational basis for upholding conjugal marriage 
laws is the capacity to distinguish in law between relational arrangements 
that are self-evidently distinguishable in relevant ways in fact. 
Legislatures rationally distinguish between man-woman monogamy, 
man-man intimacy, man-woman-woman polygamy, woman-man-man 
polyandry, man-boy pedophilia, and other intimate arrangements on the 
ground that different relational arrangements have differing levels and 
types of instrumental values to an ordered society.
214
 
States might rationally classify relational arrangements for both 
morally partisan and morally neutral reasons. Even if Bradley and 
George are incorrect in their claim that the two-in-one-flesh union of a 
man and a woman has intrinsic value, different relational arrangements 
serve different extrinsic values for individuals and the societies in which 
they participate. Legal distinctions between and among institutions such 
as marriage, civil unions, and domestic partnerships enable legislators 
and citizens to identify and protect the relative instrumental values in 
different relational arrangements. On this ground states may rationally 
call male-female monogamy by one name, same-sex intimacy by 
another, polygamy by a third name, and non-sexual supportive 
relationships (i.e. a daughter caring for an elderly mother) by a fourth 
name. Each legal institution corresponds to a different relational 
arrangement, and each relational arrangement is useful to society for 
different purposes. 
Same-sex marriage advocates make a similar point when they argue 
(unpersuasively, in the view of some)
215
 that same-sex marriage is 
distinguishable from polygamous marriage. Whether or not same-sex 
intimacy has greater moral value than polygamy, same-sex marriage 
advocates and the California Supreme Court claim to discern relevant 
distinctions between the two relationships in terms of their social utility. 
In their view, one supposes, these distinctions would serve as a rational 
basis for prohibiting polygamy while recognizing same-sex ―marriages.‖ 
Not all prudential distinctions between relational arrangements must 
imply superiority of one arrangement over another. Legislatures might 
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rationally distinguish between relationships according to the types, as 
well as the degrees, of social uses they produce. A legislature may 
determine that some relationships are valuable for some purposes, while 
other relationships are valuable for other purposes, and arrange its 
institutions so as to incentivize the most useful aspects of each type of 
relationship. 
To be sure, a state legislature is entitled to determine which intimate 
relationships are instrumentally valuable, and thus deserving of 
institutional recognition, and which ones are less useful and thus not 
deserving of their own institutions or deserving of more limited 
institutional recognition. However, state legislatures might additionally 
and rationally separate institutions not merely hierarchically along one 
axis but also in a matrix based upon a number of prudential factors. They 
might, for example, determine that non-sexual, same-sex relationships 
are beneficial for the promotion of friendship, while same-family 
pairings, such as mother-father or nephew-uncle, are useful for financial 
and emotional support. They could, based upon these findings, rationally 
establish different institutions for those types of relational arrangements. 
The distinction between those institutions would imply no moral or 
prudential superiority of one over the other. The potential axes are 
numerous. Legislatures might rationally distinguish between different 
types of erotic relationships, between different types of non-sexual 
relationships, and might distinguish erotic relationships from non-sexual 
relationships. 
A state legislature might determine that conjugal marriage is 
valuable to the State because, among other reasons, it is the best 
institution for the breeding and rearing of children.
216
 For this reason, 
 
 216. Justice Zarella noted Connecticut‘s legitimate interest ―in promoting and regulating 
procreative conduct.‖ Zarella dissent, at 9. Conjugal marriage, he observed, is rationally related to 
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responsible child rearing on the part of the biological parents.‖ Id. 
  Maggie Gallagher, an expert in these matters, after reviewing relevant social science 
studies concluded: 
 
Marriage has powerful benefits for children and communities. When parents get and stay 
married, children do better in every way that social scientists know how to measure, 
provided those marriages are not high-conflict or violent. Communities benefit from 
more productive, law-abiding citizens, more orderly schools and neighborhoods, and 
fewer troubling and expensive social problems. 
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California might afford to conjugal marriages tax breaks and other 
privileges related to stability of intimate, opposite-sex relationships and 
the raising of children. At the same time, California might create a 
separate institution for adult offspring and their ailing parents, who 
reside together for convenience of care and support, endowing that 
relational arrangement with certain rights and privileges helpful to one 
trying to care for an elderly or ailing parent. This institution might serve 
the prudential purpose of reducing the State‘s health care costs. And the 
state might create a third institution for same-sex friendship, which the 
California Supreme Court thought beneficial to an individual‘s happiness 
and well-being.
217
 The distinction between these institutions would bear a 
rational relationship to legitimate state interests. 
That conjugal marriage distinguishes between genders does not 
render it irrational.  Indeed, many laws necessarily distinguish between 
genders in order to reflect self-evident gender differences. For example, 
the state has a legitimate interest in determining the paternity of children. 
As Justice Sosman pointed out in Opinions of the Justices the 
presumption of paternity 
 
reflects reality with respect to an overwhelming majority of those 
children born of a woman who is married to a man. As to same-sex 
couples, however, who cannot conceive and bear children without the 
aid of a third party, the presumption is, in every case, a physical and 
biological impossibility.
218
 
 
Justice Sosman thought this difficulty not insuperable; ―substantial 
modification[s]‖ to the laws concerning parenthood could make sense of 
the application of those laws to same-sex unions.
219
 However, a 
moment‘s reflection reveals that this is not the case. The paternity 
presumption (to stay with that example) is designed around a biological 
fact, that women give birth. Because of this fact, mothers are easily 
identifiable while fathers, in cases of fornication and infidelity, are not. 
As Justice Sosman rightly pointed out, same-sex couples cannot bear 
children without the aid of a third party. Where that third party is a 
woman assisting two men in a male-male relationship, the presumption 
of paternity will not pertain, and the law will need some other 
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mechanism for determining parenthood. Where the third party is a male 
assisting two women in a female-female relationship, the third party 
male will not qualify for the paternity presumption and paternity will 
remain unresolved. 
It is useful to note how closely these hypotheticals resemble 
polygamy and polyandry. Indeed, for same-sex couples to procreate, they 
necessarily must cooperate with at least one additional partner, and in 
this sense their relationships resemble plural marriages. This further 
underscores the morally neutral rational basis for conjugal marriage laws. 
Any legal regime that bestows intimate same-sex relationships with some 
institutional recognition will necessarily have to distinguish those 
relationships both from conjugal monogamy and from polygamy and 
polyandry. Indeed, it will be necessary to do so not just with respect to 
paternity, but for other purposes as well. As long as polygamy remains 
prohibited, the state will need some mechanism for distinguishing third-
party participation in same-sex non-marital procreation (as in the cases 
discussed above) from third-party participation in marriage. 
Health insurance providers that provide coverage for families may 
find it necessary to distinguish between families in which both parents 
present male-specific health risks, those in which both parents present 
female-specific health risks, and those that contain some combination. 
The state might rationally identify those families in which children are 
raised by adults who did not conceive them, such as polygamous 
families, same-sex arrangements, second-marriage homes, and foster 
families.
220
 Other variations on this theme will occur to the imaginative 
reader. For these reasons, state legislatures may rationally distinguish 
different relational arrangements from each other. 
Legislatures may rationally acknowledge different characteristics 
and instrumental values inherent in certain relationships that other 
relationships do not share. When legislatures acknowledge these 
differences in law, they do so for non-moral reasons. States might 
rationally distinguish between conjugal marriage and same-sex domestic 
partnerships on the ground that conjugal marriages have, on the whole, 
demonstrated throughout history their social utility, while same-sex 
partnerships have not yet done so.
221
 On this rational basis, unrelated to 
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the relative moral worth of these two types of relationships, California 
(for example) might have given same-sex partnerships provisional 
recognition, to enable them to demonstrate their instrumental worth, as 
conjugal marriages have done. Alternatively, states might determine after 
experience and study that conjugal marriage instrumentally produces 
extrinsic benefits that other relational arrangements do not generate.
222
 
This also would constitute a morally neutral rational basis for according 
to conjugal marriage a special status in the law. 
 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
 
In the view of the majorities of the Massachusetts, California, and 
Connecticut high courts, the law must affirm that gender does not matter, 
that conjugal marital relationships are not special, and that intimate, 
same-sex relationships are deserving of special approbation in a way that 
non-marital relationships are not. These claims are not nearly as 
uncontroversial as many seem to suppose, and they certainly are not 
morally neutral. The courts‘ arguments are morally partisan because they 
promote a particular conception of human sexuality and the good. The 
claim that homosexual conduct is equally as good or worthy as conjugal 
marital sexual conduct is a moral claim because it entails a necessarily 
moral conception of the good and the worthy. 
That most people have treated the Massachusetts same-sex marriage 
decisions as morally neutral is perhaps a central reason why much of the 
debate over the justness of the decisions has generated more heat than 
light. Notwithstanding the non-perfectionist rhetoric so prominent in 
Goodridge, no morally neutral defense of the SJC‘s marriage decisions, 
taken together, is possible because the decisions are not themselves 
morally neutral. The majority‘s ruling in Opinions of the Justices and the 
reasoning that the majority employed both foreclose any reasonable 
reading of the same-sex marriage decisions that is consistent with a 
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commitment to moral neutrality. For similar reasons, the California 
Supreme Court‘s reasoning in In re Marriage Cases and the Connecticut 
Supreme Court‘s decision in Kerrigan are incapable of a morally neutral 
reading. 
Because the same-sex marriage rulings are not morally neutral, one 
trying to defend the decisions as just must engage his or her opponents 
on moral grounds. Predicating the rulings are implicit resolutions of the 
fundamentally moral questions: (1) whether conjugal marriage has 
special value, and (2) whether homosexual intimacy is a worthy human 
end (moral) or rather an act inconsistent with integral human fulfillment 
and unworthy of persons who engage in it (immoral). On these grounds, 
and on these grounds alone, will further debate prove fruitful. 
Nevertheless, though ultimate resolution of the merits of same-sex 
marriage (in legislatures and other democratic fora) must turn on the 
underlying moral dispute, there remain two rational bases for upholding 
conjugal marriage laws against judicial challenges. The first rational 
basis is morally partisan, but derives from the self-evident principle, 
accessed through the exercise of practical reason, that conjugal marriage 
has intrinsic value, and is thus in itself a basic reason for human choice 
and action. 
The second rational basis is morally neutral in the sense that it does 
not depend upon any prior commitment to a particular conception of the 
human person or human sexuality. Instead, it derives from the self-
evident observation that different relational arrangements display 
different characteristics and produce different social benefits. On this 
ground, states rationally distinguish between conjugal marriage and other 
relationships and retain for conjugal marriage a special status in the law. 
